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CONSTRUCTING SAFETY: RECONCILING ERROR PREVENTION AND ERROR 
MANAGEMENT IN OIL & GAS AND PETROCHEMICALS OPERATIONS
ABSTRACT
On the basis of a qualitative study of three different operational oil and gas and petrochemical 
sites, in the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Europe, we examine how actors construe error 
prevention and error management and how they reconcile these approaches in their everyday 
practice.  Our repertory grid data reveal that actors recognise the importance of error prevention, 
but also appreciate that emergent and unexpected issues require error management in order to 
trap, address or mitigate problems in the making.  Errors are also regarded to play an important 
role in adaptation, innovation and learning.   However, our interview data and analysis of 
incident investigation reports reflect a narrower range of factors and indicates a strongly 
institutionalised predisposition towards error prevention. There are practical implications for the 
management of process safety and for incident analysis, which may be overlooking the 
importance of error management, and also for individuals at the sharp end who may be coping 
with the gap between what they believe is important in terms of process safety and what they 
bring to the surface, share and document.
Keywords: errors, error prevention, error management, safety, process safety, paradox
(There is also a SUPPLEMENT to this article containing additional supporting information, 
accessible online in the Additional Materials section.)
INTRODUCTION
Actions undertaken in organizations are error-prone. Most errors are prevented before potential 
effects materialise, others are managed to mitigate loss, but some result in negative consequences. 
Drawing on a growing body of research on errors in organizations (Van Dyck et al., 2005; Frese 
and Zapf, 1994; Goodman et al., 2011; Hofmann and Frese, 2011; Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016; 
Reason, 1990; Zapf, Prumper and Frese, 1992), we define action errors as “unintended deviations 
from plans, goals, or adequate feedback processing, as well as incorrect actions resulting from lack 
of knowledge” (Frese and Keith, 2015: 689). Action errors differ from violations, which are 
intentional deviations from goals, plans, and standards, whereas action errors are unintended (Frese 
and Keith, 2015). Error research distinguishes between error prevention and error management 
(Frese and Keith, 2015;  Hofmann and Frese, 2011). 
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The error prevention (EP) perspective is underpinned by a belief that errors are harmful and 
damaging and must be eliminated at all costs (Frese and Keith, 2015). Whereas the error 
management (EM) perspective assumes that it is neither possible nor desirable to eradicate action 
errors in organizations because they play an important role in adaptation, innovation and learning 
(Hofmann and Frese, 2011). Despite a growing body of literature on errors (Goodman et al., 2011; 
Hofmann and Frese, 2011; Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016), there are theoretical and practical 
limitations.
Firstly, much of the existing ‘errors’ literature has been conceptual or positivist in approach 
(Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016). Few existing studies pay attention to how actors perceive EP and 
EM.  Positivist errors research typically regards EP and EM as something more or less determined 
and given, which can be conceptually represented by a set of variables causally related to each 
other (Abbott, 2001). Interpretative (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and qualitative (Johnson et al., 
2006) studies are required to explore how actors construe EP and EM and how various meanings 
interact and lead to both actions and organizational outcomes. This is important because, from an 
interpretative paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), meaning is constitutive of organizational 
phenomena (Sandberg and Alvesson, 2020). Without understanding the meaning of EP and EM, 
we cannot recognize and observe EP and EM in practice. To address these issues, our first research 
question is: how do actors construe EP and EM in their attempts to avert and mitigate adverse 
organizational consequences? 
Secondly, some errors scholars have argued that EP and EM can occur concurrently 
(Goodman et al., 2011; Hofmann and Frese, 2011; Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016) and that 
integration and balance of EP and EM is necessary and desirable (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). For 
example, in their analysis of the Air France 447 disaster, Oliver, Calvard and Potočnik (2017) 
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propose that organizations adopt “strategies that allow controls to be designed into systems while 
also developing and maintaining the disturbance-handling capabilities of those who operate them”. 
The work on high reliability organizations highlights the need for the ability to integrate, balance 
and shift between prevention and adaptation (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006). Despite calls for the 
integration of the high-reliability concept and error management theory (Frese and Keith, 2015), 
as noted above, the specific ways to achieve such an integration and balance of EP and EM in real 
organizational settings remains under-explored (Goodman et al., 2011). This motivates our second 
research question: how do actors enact, reconcile and integrate EP and EM approaches in their 
attempts to avert and mitigate adverse organizational consequences?
Thirdly, the performance of EP and EM and their possible integration is shaped by context. 
EP dominates in some contexts and in others EM prevails, but existing theory does not fully 
explain this variability. When people act, they “bring events, structures, constraints, and 
opportunities that were not there before they took action into existence and set them in motion” 
(Weick, 1988: 306). The results in our third question: how do particular contexts shape EP and 
EM?  
To address our research questions, in what follows we review the research literature on 
error prevention and error management and then present three qualitative data sets obtained from 
the operational sharp end of three separate oil and gas and petrochemical sites in a single 
multinational company. Data were obtained using Repertory Grid interviews (Kelly, 1955), semi-
structured interviews and incident investigation reports. Finally, we discuss how the findings 
address our research question and the implications for theory and practice. 
Error Prevention and Error Management
The error prevention (EP) perspective is underpinned by a belief that errors are negative and must 
be contained and prevented at all costs (Hofmann and Frese, 2011). From this perspective, there 
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is zero-tolerance of errors (Frese and Keith, 2015) because their effects quickly escalate and ramify 
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999), propagate (Reason, 1997), and cascade into component and 
system failure (Perrow, 1984). The ultimate goal of EP is the creation of ‘fail-safe’ system designs 
for ‘error free’ performance (Goodman et al., 2011) by means of employing multiple-defensive 
layers, including engineered safeguards, procedures and other administrative controls (Reason, 
1990, 2000). 
A primary goal of EP is to reduce human error (Goodman et al., 2011) and eradicate error 
precursors – conditions that provoke error. Human error can arise from individuals’ unfamiliarity 
with the task, lack of knowledge or ‘unsafe’ attitudes. To prevent errors it is important to more or 
less “control” the behavior of organizational participants by ensuring compliance with norms, 
rules, and procedures (Carroll, 1998), so that deviations from organizationally-specified goals and 
standards (Hofmann and Frese, 2011) are eliminated. EP also focuses on removing error precursors 
in the work environment, such as distractions, ineffective layout, poor access, confusing displays 
or signage, or situations where speed overrules quality (Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016) and also 
from task demands such as competing priorities, high workload, time pressure (Reason, Parker 
and Lawton, 1998).  
In contrast to EP, the EM perspective assumes that it is neither possible nor desirable to 
eradicate errors in organizations. EM assumes that unexpected threats will emerge that cannot be 
planned for and prevented, so there will always be a need to improvise and recombine knowledge 
and resources to cure or catch and correct problems in the making (Reason, 1990). EM is required 
for swift reaction to surprises (Edmondson, Bohmer and Pisano, 2001; Staw, Sandelands and 
Dutton, 1981), flexible responses to novel events (Hofmann and Frese, 2011), adjusting positively 
and bouncing back from challenging conditions and learning from errors (Hofmann and Frese, 
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2011; Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016). The idea that EM is required in order to enable rapid, 
flexible response (Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016) is evident in the literatures on high reliability 
organizations (La Porte, 1996; Roberts, 1990; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999) and resilience 
engineering (Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 2006). This literature suggests that EM requires 
flexibility and adaptive practices in service of making ‘things go right’ (Hollnagel, 2014).
The EM perspective holds that humans are understood to provide a positive contribution 
towards organizational resilience (Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 2006) by addressing design 
flaws (Rasmussen, 1997) and ‘seeing and fixing’, responding to and containing problems (Sutcliffe 
and Vogus, 2003), without knowing in advance what one will be called to act upon (Wildavsky, 
1988).  Error management practices emphasize ‘situation awareness’ (Endsley, 1999), ‘expert 
improvisation’ (Hale and Borys, 2013; Hollnagel, 2014; Leveson, 2011; Rego and Garau, 2007), 
vigilance and attentiveness (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999), mindful organising (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2006), dispersion of decision making (Roberts, Stout and Halpern, 1994), deference to 
expertise (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006), organizational evolution to circumstances (Rochlin, La 
Porte and Roberts, 1987), variety to map the uncertainty (Roberts, 1990), and bricolage (Sutcliffe 
and Vogus, 2003; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999). The primary goal of these practices is “the 
primary intention of promoting the welfare of the organization or one of its stakeholders” 
(Morrison, 2006: 6).  
EM not only helps to mitigate potential negative organizational consequences or damage 
control but it also enhances positive effects, such as learning and innovation (Frese and Keith, 
2015). Innovation and change necessarily generate errors while trying to discover successes 
(Edmondson and Lei, 2014; Hofmann and Frese, 2011). Organizations can maximise the learning 
from accidents, incidents and near misses (Leveson et al., 2009) when they treat errors as windows 
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that reveal the status and health of the system (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) and can contribute to 
the process of collective mindfulness (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999). Learning from errors 
is said to be enhanced when people are reluctant to simplify explanations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2001) and have the ability to create new categories, openness to new information, and awareness 
of more than one perspective (Langer, 1989).  
Methods
Our study design was guided by our concern for capturing actors lived experiences of EP and EM. 
We recognised that the EP and EM labels were unlikely to be used by practitioners. We needed 
complementary methods with would reveal the perceptions, constructs, meaning making, and 
practices that our research question requires. We used three established research methods for 
uncovering these. First, we used Repertory Grid Technique (Kelly, 1955) to ascertain how actors 
conceptualise the practices that contribute to the prevention and mitigation of adverse incidents. 
Second, we used semi-structured interviews to examine the practices that support or impede 
process safety. Third, we drew on official documented reports to ascertain organisationally 
sanctioned accounts of the practices and conditions that contribute to incidents. The three datasets 
helped us to examine different types of incident (actual, near miss and potential) in three different 
oil and gas and petrochemical sites within a single multinational company. 
Selection of cases
Access to the oil and gas and petrochemical sites in the multinational company was facilitated by 
both the project funder and a key contact in the host organization. The lead researcher in the project 
team had spent over 30 years working in the oil and gas and petrochemical industry (but had not 
worked at any of the sites included in this study). The oil and gas and petrochemical industry is an 
example of a hierarchical, rule-based industry that has traditionally had a focus on ‘process safety’ 
with a strong emphasis on error prevention and that has only in recent years acknowledged the 
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need for error management (Baker et al., 2007; Flin, Wilkinson and Agnew, 2014; HSE PSLG, 
2009). 
In discussion with the key contact and global and regional managers we selected three 
operational sites with varying records of success in avoiding major incidents like fires, explosions 
or toxic releases: Site A, a large recently-constructed petrochemicals complex in the Middle East, 
which was in transition from project-based to operations-based, had recently suffered a number of 
process safety incidents, including some fatalities; Site B, a rapidly-expanding oil and gas onshore 
operation in the Asia-Pacific region with a large number of geographically dispersed wells and 
production units feeding an export facility, was chosen as informants felt there would be 
opportunities for learning since it had suffered a number of fires, explosions and well blowouts 
and also some near misses and potential incidents that could have had very serious consequences; 
and Site C, an offshore oil and gas operation in Europe, had recently won the company’s award 
for process safety performance and had been in operation for over 20 years with no major process 
safety incidents in recent years. A more detailed description of the fieldwork sites is provided in 
the SUPPLEMENT to this article. The research design enabled a cross-site comparison of EM and 
EP.
Three sources of data
We interviewed a total of 73 respondents using Repertory Grid Technique and the semi-structured 
method. A manager at each site nominated by the main contact in the host company helped to 
identify suitable interviewees. Our focus was people working at the ‘sharp end’; 
operator/technicians, shift supervisors, engineers and managers directly involved in plant 
operations and maintenance. Some interviewees worked in the design, construction and renovation 
of the sites and some for contractors. The interviewee sample obtained is shown in Table 1.  
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----------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
-----------------------------
Due to interviewee time constraint or unavailability of incident information, some 
interviews were unable to include the Repertory Grid (of the total 73 interviews, 55 included a 
Repertory Grid).  However, Pareto analyses (Goffin and Koners, 2011; Micheli et al., 2012) 
indicate high confidence that data saturation was achieved (see Figure SUP–3 in the 
SUPPLEMENT). A third source of data comprised 194 reports and documents obtained from the 
three sites, relating to 117 incidents. 81% of the incidents discussed by interviewees had a 
corresponding incident report. It was not possible to ascertain whether the remaining 19% of 
incidents mentioned by respondents had not been investigated by the organisation or the reports 
had not been archived.  
Data Set 1: Repertory Grids. Repertory Grid Technique was chosen for this research 
because it is considered a powerful and adaptable tool that can “help respondents articulate their 
views on complex topics without interviewer bias” (Goffin, 2002: 199). A Repertory Grid 
interview explores how the respondent makes sense of a particular topic, by eliciting “just those 
constructs which the person uses in making sense of that particular realm of discourse – that 
particular slice of their experience” (Jankowicz, 2004: 12).
The technique is based on Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct Theory, which holds that 
people make sense of the world by observing and construing meaning from experiences, and that 
their own individual meaning of such a ‘personal construct’ is made clear by comparing it with its 
opposite, or ‘pole’. For example, a person may construe a situation as “normal operation” and 
describe the opposite ‘pole’ as “situation never seen before”. This latter, the ‘pole’, helps explicate 
the person’s intended specific meaning of the construct. Thus, the technique uncovers the ways 
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the person constructs their experience in a way that would not emerge so clearly in interviews 
which often do not explore both the ways things are and how they are not. 
The interviews proceeded by asking the interviewee to compare three examples (“triads”) 
that relate to the topic of interest and to think of ways they may be similar to or different from each 
other. A number of different triads were selected in turn by the interviewer from a set of examples 
(“elements”) agreed between the interviewer and the participant as being relevant to the topic. 
We asked each participant to come to the interview prepared to discuss two examples, with 
which they were personally familiar, of each of three types of incidents: “actual incidents” with 
real consequences, “near misses” and “potential incidents”. Our assumption was that EP and EM 
practices might vary by event type. To help participants prepare, we sent them a pre-interview 
briefing note that included industry established definitions of the three different incident types. 
The incident type definitions and a more detailed description of the Repertory Grid interview 
technique are provided in the SUPPLEMENT.
The process elicited a number of constructs that together represent the respondent’s 
repertoire of ideas they consider important about a specific topic (Jankowicz, 2004). Finally, the 
respondent was asked to rate each incident on the scale from construct to pole (from 4 to 1) 
according to the extent that the construct applied to the incident. This resulted in a matrix - the 
repertory grid (Figure 1). The horizontal axis of the grid is formed of the agreed set of elements 
(i.e., the 6 incidents), the vertical axis is formed of the list of constructs that have emerged in the 
interview, and the matrix cells contain the participant’s ratings of each element along the construct-
pole scale. The grid was analysed to extract meaning relating to the individual interviewee’s 
understanding, and when put together with other peoples’ grids, patterns of common understanding 
of a group of people can be determined (Tan and Hunter, 2002).  
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----------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
-----------------------------
The repertory grid that we obtained from each interview summarised the participant’s 
personal views about the unfolding of the incidents, in the form of a set of personal constructs, 
together with ratings indicating how much the participant considered each construct applied to 
each incident. We collated the repertory grids from the 55 interviews into a spreadsheet, together 
with explanatory quotes extracted from the interview transcripts to obtain fuller descriptions of the 
meaning of each construct. 
Analysis of Repertory Grid data. To help control for potential researcher bias in the 
analysis of the data, a one-day data workshop was run with two pairs of researchers working 
independently. Each pair comprised one experienced academic faculty member and a 
“knowledgeable practitioner” as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994: 38). To prepare for the 
workshop, two identical sets of cards were produced, printed with the wording of the construct and 
its pole, an explanatory quote and the construct reference number and the site. 
Following a similar process to Goffin and Koners (2011), the two pairs worked in separate 
rooms to code the constructs, sorting them into categories that each team established and defined 
independently. After the workshop, the two sets of categories were compared in a “reliability 
matrix”. An extract from the final reliability matrix is given in Figure SUP–2 in the 
SUPPLEMENT.
The initial comparison of the two teams’ categorisation yielded a commonality ratio 
(Goffin et al., 2012) of only 40%. The majority of the inconsistency was due to definitional clarity 
issues (Jankowicz, 2004). In most cases the two research teams agreed on the meaning of 
constructs but had assigned different labels. A second round of re-categorisation improved the 
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commonality ratio to 85% which exceeded the suggested 80% criterion (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
This data validation and first step of analysis sorted the 135 individual constructs into a 
total of 17 categories. These categories and their definitions are shown in Table 2, together with 
descriptions of the construct – pole scales indicating the sense of the construct used by participants. 
We derived these by analysing the descriptive phrases extracted from the interview transcripts and 
converting them into ‘word clouds’ to facilitate the wording of each definition and construct – pole 
scale description.  Also included in Table 2 are example illustrative quotes from the interviews, 
which we used to help further interpret and classify each of the 17 construct categories under the 
headings of EP, EM and Context. We further divided both EP and EM groups into either 
‘management practices’ that are typically enacted by managers and ‘working practices’ enacted at 
the operational working level, typically by operator/technicians.
----------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-----------------------------
Our rationale for classifying the construct categories as EP or EM was derived from our 
understanding of the literature. To help us classify, we summarised our understanding of the two 
paradigms in Table SUP – 5. From this understanding of the two paradigms, we classed the 
construct categories that were largely concerned with eradication of error precursors as EP, those 
largely concerned with detection, coping with and learning from errors we classed as EM and those 
that related to contextual factors, we classed as ‘Context’.  
Classifying some construct categories as EP or EM in this manner was relatively 
straightforward: ‘Risk Assessment’ ‘Equipment Design’ ‘Competence’, ‘Procedures’, 
‘Supervision’ and Compliance’, were easily classified as EP because they were directly concerned 
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with eradication of error precursors. However, classifying some other construct categories 
demanded more thought. For example, we determined the construct category ‘Escalation to 
Hierarchy’ as meaning that problems were referred up the hierarchy for resolution, in contrast to 
the ‘HRO’ characteristic of ‘deference to expertise’, so we interpreted this as fitting within the EP 
paradigm. In a similar manner, the construct categories of ‘Incident Investigation and Analysis’ 
‘Detection’ ‘Mitigation’ and ‘Organizational Learning’ were interpreted as aligning with the EM 
paradigm. The construct category ‘Emergency Response’ was understood as meaning action taken 
to mitigate (‘whatever is necessary…’) rather than the planning stage, so that too aligned with the 
EM paradigm.
The remaining constructs were more challenging to classify as EP or EM and required 
more detailed analysis including independent coding, inter-coder reliability checks and reference 
to the existing literature (see Table SUP-5). For example, ‘Vigilance’ could be classified as EP 
since it could be understood as contributing to Compliance, but working closely with the interview 
extracts we concluded that it is a contributor to situation awareness and Sensemaking, so was 
classified as EM. Following a similar approach, the construct category ‘Communication’ was 
understood from the interview extracts as the informal ‘non-technical skill’ that includes 
“Speaking up at meetings and…Listening” and “Being assertive … Skills for the exchange 
(transmission and reception) of information, ideas and feelings, by verbal (spoken, written) or non-
verbal methods” (Flin, Wilkinson and Agnew, 2014: 10-14) which aligns with the EM paradigm. 
Similarly, again by examining the interview quotes, ‘Checking Challenge and Follow-up’ was 
interpreted in the sense of  “intervention by a second person” (Frese and Keith, 2015: 666) so was 
classified as EM. Finally, ‘Work Pressure’ was classed as neither EP nor EM but as a contextual 
factor or error precursor, as defined earlier. 
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Sorting the data into the 17 categories of construct gives a broad description of how 
participants think about the events discussed in the interviews, and clearly some categories seem 
more important because they occurred more frequently. However, a high frequency “can also 
indicate that a construct was obvious, and therefore readily mentioned” (Goffin, Lemke and 
Szwejczewski, 2006: 200). Relying on frequency alone could thus give a misleading result. So, in 
Repertory Grid analysis another measure of importance is often used, alongside frequency: the 
variability of the construct ratings given by participants. If a construct has a wide variability of 
element ratings compared with those of other constructs within a grid, this strong differentiation 
between the elements and can be taken as a measure of its high importance to the interviewee, 
(Kelly, 1955; Rogers and Ryals, 2007). Using a combination of both frequency and variability thus 
gives a more realistic assessment of the relative importance of constructs to the participants.
As commonly used by others (Goffin, Lemke and Szwejczewski, 2006; Lemke, Clark and 
Wilson, 2011) the measures we used for frequency and variability of each construct category were 
‘percentage unique frequency’ (%UF) and ‘average normalised variability’ (ANV). The %UF 
represents the proportion of interviewees with an individual construct within that category; 
‘unique’ meaning that if more than one of a participant’s constructs were in a category, only one 
was counted. The ANV measures the relative variability of the ratings of a particular construct 
compared with the overall variability of all the ratings in a particular interviewee’s grid, normalised 
for the different numbers of constructs in the set of grids and finally averaged over all the 
occurrences of constructs in a category.
To calculate the ANV of a construct category we first calculated the variability of the 
ratings of each individual construct within that category, as the ‘percentage Total Sum of Squares’ 
(%TSS) of the construct within its grid. This is “the percentage of the total Sum of Squares 
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computed for the entire grid… reported for each construct” (Grice, 2002: 340). This calculation 
was done using the specialist repertory grid software Idiogrid  (Grice, 2002). We then normalised 
this value for the different numbers of constructs in the whole set of grids and finally averaged it 
over all the occurrences of constructs in the category. 
Again following the approach used by others (Goffin, Lemke and Szwejczewski, 2006; 
Raja et al., 2013) we then determined the constructs of particular importance to the participants 
(‘key constructs’) by establishing criteria for both %UF and ANV. Goffin et al (2006: 200). They 
note that “The frequency count necessary for identifying important constructs is left open for 
interpretation in the repertory grid literature” and they chose criteria that selected only those 
constructs in the top 50 percentile of each of the two measures, %UF and ANV, i.e., those at or 
above the median. We adopting a similar approach, selecting as ‘key constructs’ only those whose 
values of %UF and ANV were both in the ‘top half’ of the set of construct categories under 
consideration. 
Our analysis considered three such sets: first, to gain an overall view, the complete set of 
all the Repertory Grids, second, seeking patterns that may provide insight, we analysed the grids 
by incident type (‘actual’, ‘near miss’ and ‘potential incident’, which were the ‘elements’ in the 
Repertory Grids) and third, again seeking patterns that may reveal differences linked with context, 
we compared and contrasted the different sets of grids obtained at the three sites A, B and C.  Since 
the data sets were different in each site, the ‘key’ criteria were also different.  
To determine those categories of construct of most importance to the whole participant 
population without differentiating between incident types or between sites, we established our 
‘key’ criteria as a %UF value of at least 10 and an ANV value of at least 38, these figures being 
the median values of each measure for the complete data set. For the analysis based on incident 
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types, the grid data was separated out for each incident type in turn. Each of these incident-type-
specific data sets comprised all participants, so the same %UF key criterion applied, but the ANV 
values were re-calculated for each reduced grid, so a type-specific ANV key criterion was also 
necessary. For the site-based analysis, only the grids from each site were used, so site-specific key 
criteria for both %UF and ANV were recalculated. The results of applying these key criteria to 
determine the construct categories of most importance to the participants, in overall terms and 
analysed by incident type and by site, are given in Table 3, marked as Y in the Key column, and 
highlighted.
----------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
-----------------------------
Data Set 2 - Semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interviews commenced with 
a series of open-ended questions designed to elicit information about the practices used to avoid, 
trap or mitigate errors and their consequences.  Relevant follow-up questions were used to build a 
deeper understanding of the interviewees’ views about the dynamics of preventing and managing 
error. 
Analysis of Semi-Structured interview data. We started analysing the interview transcripts 
by analysing a sample of the interviews to create an initial coding template (Miles and Huberman, 
1994) and then as the analysis continued, using NVivo 12 software and following a process 
described by Walsh and Bartunek (2011) we developed the template coding model, iteratively 
comparing segments of the interviews with it. In this way, we created from the interview transcripts 
a list of 63 first-order codes, 44 being factors that were either supporting EP and EM processes 
and 19 that were impeding them. The relative frequency of mention by interviewees are shown on 
the left-hand side of Table 4, analysed into supporting or impeding, and by site, A, B or C. 
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Continuing with the Walsh and Bartunek (2011) process we then pursued a cycle of abductive and 
retroductive reasoning, informed by the existing literature on EP and EM and also by comparing 
the data with the findings of the Repertory Grid interviews.  
We grouped the first-order factors into 19 second-order theoretical categories. These are in 
the right-hand side columns of Table 4, which show the average proportion of interviewees 
mentioning a constituent factor within a category, allowing direct comparison of the frequency of 
mention at each site. We ranked these figures in a similar way as was done in the Repertory Grid 
study, and chose the  categories in the ‘top half’ of this ranking as being of most interest. These 
are shown highlighted.
----------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
-----------------------------
The classification of the 19 theoretical categories as EP or EM followed the same rationale 
and method that we used for the Repertory Grid constructs. We examined the coded segments of 
interview transcripts to guide us in this, comparing them with the EP and EM paradigms described 
earlier. Examples of these illustrative interview quotes are given in Table 5 (this is an extract: the 
complete table is in the SUPPLEMENT as Table SUP–3). Those concerned with systematic 
elimination of error precursors we classed as EP and those concerned with detecting, mitigating 
and learning from errors we classed as EM. The further distinction between those practices enacted 
at the management level and those at the operational working level was made by examining the 
wording of the constituent first order codes to identify who was involved in enacting the particular 
practices. 
----------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here
-----------------------------
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An example of the distinction between ‘supporting’ and ‘impeding’ first-order actors is 
seen in how risk management was discussed by participants: As Table 4 shows, there were 5 
interviews at site C that mentioned the ‘supporting’ factor of ‘Processes for risk management’ and 
only one that mentioned the associated ‘impeding’ factor of ‘Cumbersome risk bureaucracy’. 
These factors were both put into the theoretical category of ‘Risk Management’ which was 
classified as EP. In another example, at site A there were 6 interviews that mentioned the 
supporting factor of ‘Clarifying expectations and responsibilities’ and 7 that mentioned the 
associated ‘impeding’ factor of ‘Authoritarian over-directing’. Both of these factors were put into 
the theoretical category of ‘Planning and Resourcing’ and classified as EP.  
There is some overlap between the 17 categories of Repertory Grid constructs and the 19 
theoretical categories that emerged from the Semi-Structured interviews, but also some 
differences. This is to be expected since the focus of the Repertory Grid study was on comparing 
the three different types of incident, with the analysis done in an essentially grounded process; the 
guiding topic of Semi-Structured study was organizational practices, and although the analysis was 
partially informed by the results of the Repertory Grid study, the initial template was developed in 
a grounded manner. 
We took two steps to verify the trustworthiness of our findings. First, we asked a researcher 
who was not familiar with our initial findings to code two of the interview transcripts as a means 
to assess interrater reliability. Overall, the agreement rate was 80% percent, which is deemed 
acceptable (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We also checked systematically for data saturation by 
examining the cumulative number of codes identified from each interview. This procedure 
revealed that the last nine interviews yielded no new codes (see Figure SUP-4 in the 
SUPPLEMENT)
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Data Set 3 - Incident Documents. 194 documents relating to 117 incidents were obtained 
from the three sites, mainly ‘Incident Reports’ containing basic descriptions of the incident and 
more detailed ‘Incident Investigation Reports’ containing findings about causes and 
recommendations for avoiding future incidents.
Analysis of Incident Documents data. Following a similar process as used for the analysis 
of the semi-structured interviews (Walsh and Bartunek, 2011), we starting by analysing a sample 
of the incident documents to create an initial coding template using NVivo, and as we progressed 
through the large number of documents we refined the template into two lists: ‘Causal Factors’ 
and ‘Recommendations’. The relative frequency of mention in the documents was measured as 
unique frequency per incident, since some incidents were described in more than one document, 
and some documents repeated the same factor. These numbers were then averaged to give the 
proportion of each incident type per site.  The two lists are shown in Tables 6a and 6b
----------------------------
Insert Tables 6a and 6b about here
-----------------------------
Using the same approach as for both the Repertory Grid data and the semi-structured 
interview data, we were able to group the Causal Factors and Recommendations abductively into 
12 second-order theoretical categories, whose relative frequency of mention was a simple sum of 
the unique frequencies of their constituent factors. A Pareto analysis gave some confidence that 
theoretical saturation was achieved (see Figure SUP-5 in the SUPPLEMENT). Check coding was 
done by an independent researcher; inter-coder reliability of 80% was achieved, which is deemed 
acceptable (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Both the sets of Causal Factors and Recommendations were also classified as EP or EM, 
following the same rationale and method as before, examining the coded segments of incident 
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documents and comparing them with the EP and EM paradigms, and also distinguishing between 
management and working practices within both EP and EM. Examples of these illustrative quotes 
from the incident documents are given in Table 7a and 7b (these are extracts – the full tables are 
in Table SUP-4a and Table SUP-4b in the SUPPLEMENT.)
----------------------------
Insert Tables 7a and 7b about here
-----------------------------
The way we classified Recommendations as EP or EM should be noted: Whilst any 
learning from an investigation could be inferred as EM since EM implies a learning process, in 
this study we have instead assessed the Recommendations according to the objective of the 
recommendation – whether it is to reinforce EP or improve EM. For example, the objective of a 
recommendation such as ‘Improve procedures or other tech. documents’ is to reinforce the existing 
procedures, which are by nature EP. So this recommendation would be classed as EP. The 
reasoning here was that whilst recommendations from incident investigations are of course 
learning opportunities and on the surface might be all be classified as EM, many of the 
recommendations called for reinforcement of EP and not for adaptations or a rethinking of how 
different processes and operations could be in future Therefore, recommendations were analysed 
as either EP or EM depending on the underlying issue they are addressing.
The summary results of the Incident Documents study (Tables 6a and 6b) show an 
overwhelming preference to identify EP issues rather than EM. This is addressed further in the 
Discussion. To identify the most frequently occurring theoretical categories of Causal Factors and 
Recommendations we performed a ranking of the normalised unique frequencies, and chose the  
categories in the ‘top half’ of this ranking, similarly to the other studies. These are highlighted in 
Tables 6a and 6b.
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There is some overlap between the Repertory Grid constructs, the theoretical categories 
from the Semi-Structured interviews and the two sets of Causal Factors and Recommendations 
that emerged from the Incident Documents study. A comparison of the most important results (‘top 
half’ of the ranking) of all three studies was made and is summarised in Table 8 (See Discussion)
Findings 
Repertory Grids The findings of the Repertory Grid interviews help to explain how actors 
conceptualise the practices that contribute to the avoidance and mitigation of adverse 
consequences and those that they perceive to cause accidents. The construct definitions and results 
are presented in Table 2.
Overall View of EP and EM. The left-hand columns of Table 3 show the 17 construct 
categories that emerged as important from the overall analysis of the Repertory Grids from all 
three sites (as described in the Methods section). Firstly, it can be seen that they divide clearly into 
EP, EM and one contextual category of ‘Work Pressure’ and that the number in EP and EM is 
fairly evenly balanced at 7 and 9 respectively, with slightly more in EM than EP. Secondly slightly 
more EM construct categories (4 compared with 2 for EP) were determined to be ‘key’, that is, of 
particular importance to the interviewees. This gives an indication that, overall, the interviewees 
construed both EM and EP approaches as important, with a slight preference for EM.
Differences between Incident Types. The middle group of columns in Table 3 show the 
results of analysing the repertory grid data separately for each incident type, actual, near miss and 
potential incident. The aim was to examine whether or not actors used different constructs to 
differentiate these three event types. We were surprised by the similarity in how people construed 
the three incident types: ‘Compliance’ (EP), ‘Incident Investigation and Analysis’ (EM) and ‘Work 
Pressure’ (Context) were ‘key’ construct categories for all incident types. However, some 
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differences can be seen: ‘Detection’ and ‘Sensemaking’ (both EM) only appear as ‘key’ for 
Potential Incidents, while ‘Escalation to Hierarchy’ (EP) appears as ‘key’ only for (which are 
similar types of incident, the difference often being just luck). This is unsurprising as the 
identification of Potential Incidents is dependent on ‘Detection’ and ‘Sensemaking’, and when 
Actual Incidents and Near Misses do occur, it is expected that they would be reported up the 
organization’s hierarchy. 
Differences between Sites. The right-hand group of columns in Table 3 show the results 
of analysing the repertory grid data separately for each site, A, B and C, to examine whether actors 
at the different sites construed the relative importance of EP and EM in different ways. The balance 
between EP and EM constructs was quite different for each site. Out of 7 constructs determined as 
‘Key’ for Site A, only 3 were EM, while for Site B, 5 out 9 key constructs were EM. Finally, it is 
striking that for Site C, all 6 out of 6 key constructs were EM. The context of ‘work pressure’ can 
also be seen as ‘Key’ for only Sites A and B and not Site C. The apparent importance of EM 
practices for the Site C respondents is particularly notable, since Site C was recognised by key 
informants within the company as having had the best safety outcomes.
Comparing across sites raises the possibility of a confound between differences between 
sites and types of interviewee. We analysed the coded extracts from the interviews and found any 
differences between the coded categories were not attributable to level in the organization. This is 
likely because although the interviewees were at different levels of hierarchy, they were all 
working very close to the sharp end of operations, maintenance and engineering.
Comparing these two different analyses, a correspondence is seen between the EM 
approach both with the better outcome of Potential Incidents and also with the better safety 
outcomes of Site C, while the EP approach can be seen to be more closely associated both with 
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Sites A and B and also with both Near Miss and Actual Incidents. A possible interpretation is that 
the EM approach is more successful in detecting system weaknesses (Potential Incidents) before 
they can incubate into Actual of Near Miss incidents.
A possible explanation for the small number of constructs appearing in the Repertory Grids 
for Site C is that people on this site were focussing on what they perceived as the most important 
ideas. That all these constructs were of an EM nature may support this view; the EP aspects of 
procedures, compliance, competence and risk assessment perhaps being taken for granted. An 
analogy could be that of a sports coach focussing on a small number of aspects to improve, rather 
than giving a complete description of everything that someone would need to perform well and 
are already doing.
Semi-Structured Interviews The semi-structured interviews help to explain how actors 
reconcile EP and EM in their everyday practice. Illustrative quotes from the interviews are given 
in Table SUP-3 in the SUPPLEMENT and the results are summarised in Table 4. 
Respondents from both Site A and B reported organizational constraints such as inadequate 
resourcing, unclear responsibilities and change fatigue. Site B interviews made numerous 
mentions of production pressure. A Site B Engineer noted “Everybody wants now, tomorrow, day 
after, very short-term and medium-term focused.” Site C was reported to have a more open, 
trusting culture with a lower threshold for expressing views and reporting issues. By contrast, Site 
A interviewees made frequent mention of blame culture as illustrated by a Site A Supervisor “if I 
say like this, then there will be a lot of finger pointing, then we end up missing actually what 
caused this one”.
At Site C there was a greater emphasis on both EP and EM than at the other two sites. 
Around a third of interviewees at Site C reported EP practices of planning and resourcing and a 
Page 23 of 51 Academy of Management Discoveries
norm of compliance as ‘supporting’ factors and a quarter similarly mentioned technical 
competence. In stark contrast, planning and resourcing and procedures were mentioned as 
‘impeding’ factors by a third and a quarter of respondents respectively at Site A. As one respondent 
at Site C noted “I think it's very experienced personnel in the control room. The operators, I think 
they know the hazards very good’.  
Site C respondents made many more mentions of ‘supporting’ EM practices than those at 
the other sites, for example over a third at Site C mentioned encouraging improvement, compared 
with a fifth at Sites A and B. Also at Site C a third of respondents mentioned the contextual 
condition of structure and maturity as supportive, while both Sites A and B mentioning this as 
‘impeding’. 
At Site A, respondents described cumbersome risk management processes. A manager at 
Site A commented, “if I look at the incidents, it's not that we didn't spot the hazard and we didn't 
put a whole bunch of controls on it but we may have actually overloaded the work crew”. 
Interviewees at Site B indicated similar factors impeding effective EP: “…we're a long way from 
where we need to be. The procedures that we've got in the business are one task fits all…” (Site B 
supervisor).
A significant difference across the sites was in relation to the EM practices of mindful 
compliance and questioning, strong response to a weak signal, and teamworking to solve 
problems. These factors together were mentioned by almost half of the respondents at Site C but 
only 10% and 8% respectively at Sites A and B. Site C interviewees also reported building 
situation awareness, building capacity for improvisation, supporting risk awareness but these 
factors were barely mentioned at the other two sites. A Site C manager commented “We have quite 
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a lot of potential incidents, and I think that's a good thing, because potential incidents tell me as a 
leader that we actually notice it”.
We observed how EP and EM practices were successfully entwined, particularly at Site C, 
where EM was being clearly viewed as a collaborative approach. The modification of a procedure 
to suit actual working conditions was always discussed. There was a network of ‘technical 
authorities’ for specific subjects who were routinely consulted by operations and maintenance 
staff, often informally by phone or video link, with decisions frequently being agreed there and 
then, and sometimes requiring technical studies. Work started with the EP practices of using 
effective procedures with technical competence and a norm of compliance. During the work, EM 
practices of mindful compliance and questioning and supporting risk awareness were also 
followed. Whenever a system weakness was identified, this triggered EM practices of strong 
response to a weak signal, building situation awareness and teamworking to solve problems, 
resulting in a technical solution, supported by the EM practice of deferring to expertise. Finally, 
the technical solution was implemented, and the (EP) procedure was modified.  
The management practices found to be most associated with this effective entanglement of 
the two approaches were sensemaking/sensegiving, engaging & supporting workers, supporting 
formal networks and supporting informal networking. Contextual conditions were also important. 
At Site C the low threshold and accessible leaders were seen as providing a supportive environment 
in which the interplay of these practices could flourish.  
In terms of practices, sensemaking and challenging assumptions were mentioned by around 
a third of interviewees at sites A and B but, interestingly, was mentioned by fewer participants 
(20%) at Site C. A Site B manager indicated this may be because leaders in sites B and A needed 
to help people understand process safety hazards in their work because “they had never 
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experienced anything any different and they've never been educated around process safety 
risks…”.  A very significant difference between the three sites was enabling rule-following AND 
competent improvisation, which was mentioned by almost half the respondents (48%) at Site C 
but only 5% at Site A. A manager at Site C commented “You're complying but then you are 
professional enough to know when you have to deviate and then it's smarter to deviate than actually 
just following the rule. I think that's part of the organization knows that…”.
Improvisation is of course a contentious issue in the context of process safety incidents, in 
a sector that puts a premium of rule adherence. However, the improvisation process observed at 
Site C, described above, was collaborative, deliberately involving the requisite expertise (formally 
empowered in the form of nominated ‘technical authorities’) to decide how to deviate safely in a 
particular situation. Competence to improvise is thus understood as organizational competence, 
also relying on individual mindful questioning, to avoid ‘mispliance’ (Reason, Parker and Lawton, 
1998: 295).
Incident Documents The analysis of the incident documents helps to explain how actors’ 
personal experiences of EP and EM compare with formal accounts published in incident reports. 
Illustrative quotes extracted from the incident documents are given in Tables SUP-4a and SUP-4b 
in the SUPPLEMENT (extracts from these are given in Tables 7a and 7b). The summary results 
of coding the documents are shown in Table 6a (Causal Factors) and Table 6b (Recommendations). 
The left-hand side of Tables 6a and 6b lists first order Causal Factors and Recommendations 
identified in the documents, analysed by type of incident and by site. These are then grouped on 
the right-hand side of these tables into the second-order ‘Theoretical Categories’. The relative 
frequency of mention of these categories is shown by the ‘Totals for Theoretical Categories’ 
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figures, which are the totals of the normalised unique frequencies of the constituent codes of each 
category, analysed by incident type and site.  
The results show that the causal factors identified and the recommendations made in these 
formal documented reports overwhelmingly reflect the EP approach, which contrasts with the 
importance given by the interviewees to the interplay of EP with EM. This bias towards EP is 
borne out by the quotes from the incident documents. For example, ‘Inadequate Procedures’ was 
a very frequent causal factor identified in incident documents at both Site A: ‘Method statement 
and JSA (Job Safety Analysis) lacking appropriate work method detail and associated hazard 
controls’ and Site B: ‘The Work Instruction assigned to the job added limited value and more 
importantly did not relate the critical components of the work scope’, and many recommendations 
were to improve procedures: ‘add new step in maintenance procedure: to stroke test valves in the 
field after installation to confirm actuator is moving freely’ (Site A report) and ‘New procedure to 
facilitate the depressurizing of the Piping ex. the discharge XV’s to fin fan rack’ (Site B report).  
Production pressure occurred as a frequent causal factor in reports from all three sites in 
statements such as ‘Time pressure resulted in Area 1 mech supervisor executing the work himself 
instead of searching for different support personnel’ (Site A report) ‘more focussed with 
production / cost saving initiatives than asset integrity. Concern was explicitly voiced that these 
fires are continually occurring’ (Site B report) and ‘Operator stressed to complete job within the 
night shift and stressed by weather conditions (heavy rains, papers wet), which caused the decision 
to break the isolation plan’ (Site C report). These extracts from the incident documents emphasise 
the overall major EP focus in the incident documents, both on causal factors and recommendations. 
A similar, though slightly different, pattern is seen for the recommendations (Table 6b): 
although only minor variation in the proportion of EM recommendations is seen across incident 
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types, across the sites there are more differences: At Site A less than a fifth of recommendations 
were EM, Site B just over 10%, while almost a third of the recommendations made at Site C were 
EM in nature. For example: ‘To avoid future similar incidents Projects /Asset to share practices 
between Platform and Onshore plant and possibly agree one leading practice’ and ‘Giving a 
problem statement, a solution or an action will probably not shift your belief. Giving you insights 
and understanding on what caused the problem will’ (both quotes from Site C reports). The Site C 
reports made proportionally many more recommendations than either Site A or Site B in the 
categories of ‘Organizational Learning’ (between 3 and 5 times as many), ‘Compliance’ (between 
2 and 5 times as many) and ‘Planning & Resourcing’ (between 2 and 3 times as many). These 
cross-site comparisons are interesting because of Site C’s better perceived safety performance.
Discussion and contributions
A comparison of the findings from the three studies is presented in Table 8, which enables 
us to compare and contrast three key aspect of our data: a) the three incident types, b) the three 
data sets and c) the three sites.
----------------------------
Insert Table 8 about here
-----------------------------
Comparing and contrasting the three incident types Our initial assumption was that 
potential incidents might emphasise error prevention and near misses could emphasise error 
management practices that were taken to stop a hazard from leading to significant consequences. 
However, Table 8 shows that there is little difference between how respondents construe event 
types. Actual incidents are, in the oil & gas and petrochemicals industry, typically recorded, 
reported to government safety regulators and investigated to find system weaknesses that can be 
corrected in an attempt to avoid recurrence of such an incident. Because by definition no 
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consequences result from potential incident and near misses and few regulators demand reporting 
of near miss incidents, their identification is more problematic than Actual Incidents (Phimister et 
al., 2003; Van Der Schaaf and Kanse, 2004). Thus although they may be observed by people 
working in operations or maintenance, they are more easily ignored or covered-up (Lawton and 
Parker, 2002) so may not be identified within an organization’s incident management processes, 
or there may be a lack of ‘organizational commitment to ensure that such lessons are remembered’ 
(Hopkins, 2010: 62).
Many organizations operating high hazard technology in developed countries do recognise 
the potential value of near misses for learning about system weaknesses and therefore have internal 
management processes that encourage or even demand that Near Miss incidents are reported 
internally and investigated, although they may not be implemented as rigorously as for Actual 
Incident. Potential Incidents also have the potential for revealing ‘latent conditions’ and ‘active 
failures’ (Reason, 1990, 2016, 1997). The fact that respondents provided important insights about 
EP and EM when discussing all three events types, suggests that there are opportunities for 
organizations to learn about errors by examining potential incidents and near misses as well as 
actual incidents. 
Comparing and contrasting the three data sets Table 8 shows the construct categories that 
emerged from the Repertory Grid analysis determined as the most important (‘Key’) by 
participants, below that the most frequent factors that emerged from the analysis of the semi-
structured interviews, and below that, the most frequent factors that emerged from the analysis of 
the incident documents analysis. There is some overlap between the 17 categories of Repertory 
Grid constructs and the 19 theoretical categories that emerged from the Semi-Structured 
interviews, but also some differences. These differences are to be expected since we intentionally 
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treated them as separate datasets and later compared and contrasted the findings. The rationale was 
to ascertain whether or not there were differences between how individuals construe events and 
organisationally approved accounts in the form of official documents. The focus of the Repertory 
Grid study was on comparing the three different types of incident, with the analysis done in an 
abductive process; the guiding topic of Semi-Structured study was management practices 
associated with EP and EM, and although the analysis was partially informed by the results of the 
Repertory Grid study, the initial template was also developed in an abductive manner, and this 
approach was repeated for the analysis of the incident reports.
Table 8 portrays the distribution of the key factors that emerged from the three studies. The 
Table shows that the repertory grid technique identified ‘hidden’ meaning, or a ‘deeper’ meaning 
than is directly shared in the interviews or documented in the incident reports. The repertory grid 
interviews show that participants hold a broad array of constructs about both EP and EM, which 
they regard as important, but during the interviews, respondents discussed a much narrower range 
of EP practices that support process safety. The analysis of incident reports shows an even 
narrower range of constructs and are heavily skewed toward EP.  
The ‘causes’ and recommendations resulting from the incident investigations were almost 
exclusively EP in nature (rather than EM) perhaps reflecting the more ‘acceptable’ discourse of 
prevention and the traditional ‘rule-following’ and ‘command and control’ paradigm prevalent in 
high hazard industries. Incident investigations often suffer from ‘hindsight bias’ (Dekker, 2011) 
and focus on finding and fixing problems “rather than to challenge deep assumptions with rigorous 
and systemic thinking…” (Carroll, 2002: 124). This is particularly so since recommendations 
emanating from incident reports are shaped by current institutionalised industry guidance. The 
absence of EM from incident reporting may sometimes even be deliberate, since ‘organizational 
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learning is a political process shaped by the interpretations and interests of competing 
stakeholders…’ who may seek to reinforce the existence of EP to ‘protect themselves from 
scapegoating by producing their own event narratives’ (Buchanan and Denyer, 2013: 213). 
Comparing and contrasting the three sites Acknowledging the potential existence of other 
unobserved site differences, a cross-site comparison does enable us to make some tentative 
observations about the influence of context on EP and EM and the effect on organizational 
outcomes: First, for Sites A and B, many more EM practices are seen as important in the Rep Grid 
study than in either the Semi-Structured interviews or the Incident Documents studies. Second, for 
Site A, there are no EM management practices seen as ‘key’ in any of the studies. We suggest that 
organizational contextual conditions provide possibilities for some actors to discuss EM and the 
integration with EP but constrain others. Actors are subject to normative pressures and cognitive 
constraints to embrace practices regarded as appropriate or legitimate (Greenwood, Suddaby and 
Hinings, 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005, Scott, 1994: 74). The oil and gas sector is naturally 
highly procedural with a strong focus on conformity and compliance, increasing the likelihood that 
actors will frame discourses to resonate with established interests and values. 
We suggest that responding to the organization’s expectations narrows the range of 
constructs people choose to discuss, creating a gap between what people believe is important in 
terms of process safety and what they are willing bring to the surface, share and document. This 
was the case at Site A and to some extent Site B, where there appears to be a stronger organizational 
emphasis on EP. Only at Site C did respondents feel able to discuss the virtues of EM, such as 
expert improvisation, problem solving, change and learning. At Site C, we find that the perceived 
confidence, consistency and control afforded by established and effective EP. At Site C, 
respondents reported leadership, a supportive environment and a strong learning orientation as key 
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elements that stimulated reflection and productive dialogue about the interplay of EP and EM, 
which in practice required time and encouragement to develop.
Our study is not without limitations. Whilst an interpretative and fine-grained research 
approach to studying errors – such as studying a single multi-national organization – is important 
for developing new theory, we recognize the limitations of such an approach. Although we 
consider that the characteristics of the three sites were described sufficiently to differentiate them, 
the descriptions are inevitably incomplete and other information about process safety practices, 
outcomes and culture at the three sites would add to this picture. We also recognise that 
categorisation of constructs, practices and other factors as either EP or EM can be challenging and 
open to interpretation. To overcome this we independently coded the data and performed an 
assessment of inter-coder reliability.  We have explained our rationale in the analysis sections for 
each of the three data sets, but accept that other interpretations are possible. 
Although we guarded against bias, as in any qualitative research, that concern remains. 
Specifically, for the Repertory Grid study, we acknowledge that limitations include some missing 
data points in some repertory grids, some doubtful distinction between the types of event by some 
interviewees, the small average number of constructs that were obtained per interview, and that 
the imbalance across sites of number and type of interviewees. Although we claim no statistical 
significance or correlation for the differences so analysed, some clear associations have been 
suggested between the process safety outcomes of the sites and both the broad theoretical 
dimensions that emerged from the analysis and some of the first and second-order codes that were 
obtained from the interview data. But the causal direction and mechanisms underlying these 
associations is not well understood; the greater focus on EM at site C may have led to the better 
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outcomes, or such outcomes may allow more opportunity to focus on EM compared with the other 
sites where the occurrence of major indents may be forced to focus on EP.
Caution should of course be exercised in interpreting the generalizability of these 
associations.  Yet this opens the possibility for some compelling research opportunities when we 
think about the integration of EP and EM and organizational outcomes. Further empirical analysis, 
involving larger samples and quantitative methods to examine the relationship between error 
prevention and management and safety outcomes would be a fruitful direction for future research. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 1987) is another obvious next step to build 
on our exploratory work with other new studies to examine the configuration of EP and EM 
variables and their interrelationships and how these affect organizational outcomes. Recognising 
that Repertory Grid technique is not in common use in organizational research, the novel use in 
this study to compare event types offers a flexible, focused and highly contextualized abductive 
process with much potential value to researchers in management and organization studies. Other 
high hazard industries such as rail, nuclear power and commercial aviation also combine a 
traditional highly procedural approach with error management (Cacciabue, 2005; Helmreich, 
2000; IAEA, 2013) allowing some potential for comparisons and avenues for future research.
Conclusions
This study addresses three interrelated questions that address theoretical and practical challenges 
apparent in the literature on errors in organisations. Firstly, the study reveals how actors construe 
EP and EM in their attempts to avert and mitigate adverse organizational consequences. As we 
have shown in this paper, much of the existing ‘errors’ literature refers primarily to antecedents or 
errors and error coping strategies (Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016) with sparse attention to how 
actors perceive EP and EM and how they can be integrated.  
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Existing errors research is conceptual or tries to explain EP and EM by examining 
regularities among variables. Our empirical investigation of the interplay of EP and EM is 
interpretative (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and qualitative in character (Johnson et al., 2006). The 
study has enabled an exploration of the underlying meanings behind EP and EM practices from 
the respondent’s ‘point of view’. We suggest that the repertory grid technique helped participants 
to become aware of their implicit constructs, which included EM constructs, yet in discussing 
incidents during the semi-structured interviews respondents tended to focus on EP, perhaps in an 
attempt to convey what they would like others to think they do. Thus, our study reveals an 
important mismatch between the error constructs that people think are important and the practices 
that they are willing to share and document. The importance actors ascribe to the value of EM 
challenges traditional, institutionalized views and the singular preoccupation with EP in many 
organizations. 
Secondly, our study reveals how actors enact, reconcile and integrate EP and EM 
approaches in their attempts to avert and mitigate adverse organizational consequences. The errors 
literature tends to emphasize EP, which our findings suggest underplays the importance of EM in 
achieving organizational outcomes such as process safety. The findings from this study support 
previous work (Hofmann and Frese, 2011; Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016; Frese and Keith, 2015) 
suggesting that EP is a more ‘natural’ response than EM only and therefore there is seldom an 
organizational choice between EP or EM but typically a choice between EP alone or the 
combination of EP and EM. Drawing on the work on tensions and paradox in organizational 
settings (Clegg, da Cunha and e Cunha, 2002; Lewis, 2000; Lewis and Smith, 2014; Milosevic, 
Bass and Combs, 2018; Smith and Lewis, 2012; Zhang et al., 2015) our overall conclusion is that 
EP and EM should not be regarded as separate opposites (Lewis and Smith, 2014) with an 
Page 34 of 51Academy of Management Discoveries
‘either/or’ choice that is related to context, but are fundamentally interdependent—contradictory 
but also mutually enabling.
Our study has implications for the management of process safety and incident investigation 
processes, which may be overlooking the importance of EM to process safety, and also for 
individuals at the sharp end who may be coping with the gap between what they believe is 
important in terms of process safety and their willingness to bring to the surface, share and 
document EM. Managers should learn to expect both errors and unexpected situations and see 
these as opportunities to enact EM rather than as an indication of poor EP. Organisations need to 
encourage reflection and productive dialogue about the role and value of EM. Our finding that 
anxiety about EM may create defensive responses, highlighting the need for psychological safety 
to help people feel both comfortable with and responsible for discussing and enacting EM 
(Edmondson and Lei, 2014).
Thirdly, in examining errors in three different oil and gas and petrochemicals sites the 
research shows how particular contextual conditions can shape EP and EM. There are practical 
implications for organisations which may be overlooking the importance of EM to process safety. 
While organisations within these industries primarily engage in relatively prescriptive and routine 
activity, they can also suddenly encounter novel, unprecedented challenges. In contexts requiring 
rapid adaptation, existing systems, procedures and routines can unravel, disrupting the 
organization. Destabilizing conditions require flexibility and improvised behaviors (Cornelissen, 
Mantere and Vaara, 2014; Weick, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007) and more fluid approaches to collective action (Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey, 2007). It 
is therefore unsurprising that in the repertory grid data respondents acknowledged the importance 
of supplementing rigid EP with more fluid EM. However, a loss of stability may stimulate anxiety 
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and create defensive responses that can impede the required response and adaptation. We believe 
that respondents’ reluctance to bring to the surface, share and document EM, despite 
acknowledging its importance in the repertory grids, reveal a deeply held, institutionalised belief 
that EM may result in a loss of control and instability, also generating anxiety and producing 
defensive responses. In order for the organizational discourse to widen to include more EM 
practices there needs to be clear expectations that EM work is acceptable, authorised and valued.  
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CONSTRUCT a b c d e f POLE
2.q.1 SENSEMAKING
process safety barriers understood
and good reporting of failures
4 3 1 2 3 1
poor understanding of PS barriers
and poor reporting
2.q.2 MITIGATION reaction of isolate and make safe 4 1 1 1 1 1





4 4 2 1 3 3







4 1 4 1 3 2 local shallow investigation




correct risk perception of hazard 4 1 1 1 4 1 low risk perception
Elements
Actual Near-miss Potential
Table 1  Populations sampled
Job Type Organizational level Rep Grid Interviews Semi-structured Interviews
SITE A B C A B C
Contractor 7 0 0 8 0
Operator/Technician 3 1 0 4 0 1
Supervisor or Engineer 3 13 1 2 17 6
Ops/Maintenance
Ops/Maint. Manager 3 13 8 4 12 11
Contractor 0 0 0 0 0 1
Operator/Technician 0 1 0 0
Supervisor or Engineer 0 0 0 0 2 0
Engineering Manager 1 1 0 3 2
Design/Construction
Totals 17 29 9 21 31 21
Page 40 of 51Academy of Management Discoveries
Table 2 – Construct Categories from Repertory Grid Interviews
Construct – Pole Scale
Construct 
Category
Illustrative Quotes from Rep Grid 
interviews
Definition 
(Element of EP / EM Strategy) Sense of 
Construct
Sense of Pole
EP / EM 
Category.
Risk Assessment
So we knew we understood the risk.  It was 
just about how do you manage that risk
Analysis of hazards and risks, 
determining their probability and 
consequences and considering how 
they might cascade into component 












No engineering controls over over-fill of 
diesel tanks - manual operation
Use of ‘fail-safe’ and ergonomic 
equipment and system designs and 
employing multiple-defensive 
layers, including engineered 
safeguards and controls, 









They wouldn’t have the same hydrocarbon 
experience… that whole importance of 
isolation etc is not so imbued and 
inculcated…
Assuring the requisite skill, 
knowledge and experience to do 






people, lacking in 
competence 
Procedures
Operating procedures. Most of those being 
in the control room, are control room 
procedures. So there are a few field tasks in 
there as well, so talking about the ones we 
use most of the time…We've probably got 
ten to twelve that we use regularly
Formal work procedures and 
administrative controls.
Existence of  
effective 
procedures




We are always communicating with our 
PTLs [Production Team Leaders] on some 
grey areas, like am I even supposed to do 
this? Then our supervisor will give us what 
is supposed to be done.
Those in authority and hierarchical 
positions taking responsibility for 
the work of others, issuing 







We all say, as long as your line manager 
approves, then it’s good.  So we understand 
nothing bad happens....  With these two 
cases, people talked to their line manager 
and still things got screwed up.  
Escalation to those in authority and 
hierarchical positions for making 
key decisions.
Reliance on 
supervisor or line 
manager approval
Deference to 
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Construct – Pole Scale
Construct 
Category
Illustrative Quotes from Rep Grid 
interviews
Definition 
(Element of EP / EM Strategy) Sense of 
Construct
Sense of Pole
EP / EM 
Category.
Compliance
So I think for this one, the panel operator 
followed the correct procedure. Actually 
this guy, I think he did a good job.
Ensuring compliance with 
organizationally specified or 
industry standards, norms, rules, 
and procedures.  
Compliance with 
organizationally 












This one was a full-on emergency, so it got 
all the response whatever you need...
The immediate action of mitigation 
















Response was to involve an independent 
person coming in to investigate
Investigation and analysis of 













Good learning:  we've gone round put big 
stickers on the valves to clarify tagging
Acquisition, dissemination, and 
implementation of knowledge or 






lack of or 
misunderstanding 






The isolation authority identified it 'cos it 
had conflicting information attached
Noticing signals, hazards, risks or 
signs of an impending incident
Noticing hazards as 
an incident unfolds
Failure to notice 
hazards as an 
incident unfolds
Vigilance
We have very few actual incidents. We have 
quite a lot of potential incidents, and I think 
that's a good thing, because potential 
incidents tells me as a leader that we 
actually notice it [laughs]. And is aware 
that, hey, here it could actually have 
happened something, but it didn’t, we 
stopped it before it did, but we reported so 
we can learn…
Being alert to and mindful of 
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Construct – Pole Scale
Construct 
Category
Illustrative Quotes from Rep Grid 
interviews
Definition 
(Element of EP / EM Strategy) Sense of 
Construct
Sense of Pole
EP / EM 
Category.
Sensemaking
People will actually say, “Oh, we’re not 
certain about this anymore.” Actually, 
actively go out and seek that confirmation 
rather than just blindly going ahead 
because that's what the procedure says.
Interpreting present conditions and 
developing situational awareness of 












We talk to each other so we know, "What 
are you going to do today?" And in the 
mechanical often needs help from us to 
work together
The interpersonal verbal and non-
verbal exchange and processing of 








So if he wouldn’t have personally 
intervened to do that situation, the line-up 
was identical to the other incident we had, 
we could have had a backflow.. So the 
potential incident backflow, by intervention 
of the operator we actually prevented that
Intervention to challenge or 
question the potential impact of a 
decision, work method or situation, 
including follow-up checking
Effective challenge
Ineffective or no 
challenge
Mitigation
They completely stopped the job on site and 
dealt with it...
Individual or collective actions to 
reduce the consequences of 
incidents, including unplanned 
actions
Job stopped, 
problem dealt with 
and secured
No or ineffective 








These two we had the 'hang on we're just 
trying to get Train 1 running… keep 
charging ahead. Nothing really stopped we 
didn't shut down... rush rush...
Tension or pressure on people 
created by competing priorities, 
time, productivity drivers and 




from line; rush and 
stress
No pressure or rush 
from line; relaxed 
environment
CONTEXT
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Table 3 – Summary Results of Repertory Grid Analysis
Incident Type Site
Overall
All AI NM PI A B CConstruct
%UF ANV KEY %UF ANV KEY ANV KEY ANV KEY %UF ANV KEY %UF ANV KEY %UF ANV KEY
Criteria for 'Key' ≥10 ≥38 ≥10 ≥33 ≥26 ≥28 ≥13 ≥29 ≥8 ≥38 ≥11 ≥35
EP / EM Category
Risk Assessment 10 39 Y 10 47 Y 16 33 Y 19 34 Y 8 41 Y 0 0
Equipment Design 8 32 8 8 19 33 19 25 4 38 0 40
Competence 8 26 8 26 48 4 13 22 8 30 0 0
Procedures 20 37 20 12 26 Y 31 Y 38 35 Y 15 32 Y 0 0
Supervision 4 51 4 19 0 0 13 45 Y 0 0 0 0




Compliance 18 38 Y 18 35 Y 43 Y 52 Y 19 35 Y 23 38 Y 0 0
EP WORKING 
PRACTICES
Emergency Response 10 39 Y 10 5 35 Y 7 0 0 15 40 Y 11 40 Y
Incident Investigation 
and Analysis
25 38 Y 25 49 Y 45 Y 32 Y 0 0 42 39 Y 22 0




Detection 37 39 Y 37 19 22 44 Y 13 33 Y 46 39 Y 56 48 Y
Vigilance 22 41 Y 22 33 Y 33 Y 24 38 34 Y 4 50 44 55 Y
Sensemaking 16 36 16 20 21 38 Y 13 29 Y 19 37 Y 11 43 Y
Communication 6 32 6 38 13 0 19 28 0 0 0 0
Checking Challenge and 
Follow-up
2 54 2 68 0 0 6 48 0 0 0 0
Mitigation 8 42 8 80 18 53 0 0 12 40 Y 11 60 Y
EM WORKING 
PRACTICES
Work Pressure 12 43 Y 12 40 Y 46 Y 28 Y 25 37 Y 8 47 Y 0 0 CONTEXT
%UF  = % Unique Frequency             ANV = Average Normalised Variability               KEY = Constructs most important to participants
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Table 4 - Summary Results of Coding of Semi-Structured Interviews
First order factors - Evidence from interviews
No of interviews mentioning the factor at least once
Theoretical Categories
 (Normalised Average %)





A    B    C
IMPEDING
SITE
A    B    C
SITE
A    B    C
SITE
A     B     C
Processes for risk management 1 5 Cumbersome risk bureaucracy 2 2 1
Processes for situation awareness 1 2 3
Average 2 1 4 1 1 1
Risk 
Management
10 3 19 5 3 5
Clarifying expectations & resps 6 7 8 Authoritarian over-directing 7 1
Effective monitoring & control 5 4 4
Effective planning and resourcing 2 6 8
Encouraging proactive  work 1 1 4
Prioritising process safety 5 8 10
Average 4 5 7 7 1
Planning and 
Resourcing
19 16 33 33 5
Technical Competence 5 Lack of tech competence 1 2 Competence 24 5 6
Effective Procedures 2 3 Unclear procedures 5 6 Procedures 6 14 24 19
Embedding improved designs 2 2 Ineff. embedding of improvements 4 2 3
Embedding improved procedures 2 5 7
Embedding improved competence 1
Average 2 2 3 4 2 3
Embedding 
Improvements








Engaging & supporting workers 5 10 5 Ineff. engagement or support 2 1
Protecting people from politics 1 4 3
Removing difficult people 4 1
Supporting formal networks 6 2 4
Supporting informal networking 4 2 4




19 13 14 10 5
Enabling rule-following AND 
competent improvisation
1 8 10




Demonstrating passion for safety 1 3 6
Encouraging new ideas 6 9 10




Encouraging diverse skills & views 5 2 2 Ineffective support of diversity 3
Encouraging effective teamwork 3 3 9
Average 4 3 6 3
Encouraging 
teamwork
19 10 29 14
Encouraging leadership at all levels 2 3
Influencing within peer group 2 7







Sensemaking 9 19 8 Giving mixed messages 1 3
Challenging assumptions 5 4 1
Average 7 12 5 1 3
Sensemaking & 
Challenging
33 39 24 5 14
Identifying & reporting PIs 5 6 5
Reporting & analysing NMs & AIs 1




Mindful compliance & questioning 1 1 5 Acting with complacency 3
Strong response to a weak signal 3 2 4
>Reviewing & analysing PIs 2 4
Teamworking to solve problems 7
Average 2 3 10 3
Reluctance to 
Simplify
10 10 48 14
Building situation awareness 1 1 4




Building capacity for improvisation 1 3 Improvising without risk awareness 2 1 1
Supporting risk awareness 8
Average 1 2 4 2 1 1
Commitment to 
Resilience
2 5 19 10 3 5
Countering deference to hierarchy 2
Deferring to expertise 2 3
Delegating decision-making 1 6 2







Just culture 1 2 1 Blame culture 5 3 1
Reporting culture 3 2 Ineffective learning processes 1 1 1
'Stop' culture 2 3 Production pressure 3 8 4
Open culture - trust & low threshold 2 7 Ineffective mgt of stress or fatigue 1
Average 2 1 3 3 3 2
Culture 10 3 14 14 10 10
Accessible leaders - flat structure 6 Inadequate resourcing 3 5 1
Unclear responsibilities 3 5 1
Ineff. transition Proj to Ops 4 5 1
Too much change too quickly 7
Average 6 3 6 1
Structure & 
Maturity
29 14 19 5
CONTEXT
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Table 5  EXTRACT from Table SUP–3  Illustrative Quotes and Categorisation of Factors from Semi-Structured Interviews 
Theor. Cat. Site Illustrative Quote from Semi-Structured Interviews EP / EM Cat.
A
So very interactive session, about two hours, we do it every quarter on a couple of processes. And that gives two 
ways. That gives them the way of our assurance on how healthy we are in execution, but it also gives the 
opportunity to feedback what we think can be better in the procedures.
B
I think the way that I do it is I engage the technicians in doing all of the red lining and reviewing of 




They have found several errors between the control room master P&ID and on the site. They have then now 
suggested to actually elevate this as a bigger project…I know that when they raise that to their leadership, they 





But always the issue is the implementation. For example, when you see the documentation, and the rules and 
procedures, everything is there, but who is going to implement it. So the leaders are giving the coaching, 
showing the way, the direction, the guidance, everything, but always the problem is with the implementation.
B
If you feel the procedure is not working, the procedure is not letting you to get to the desired objective, stop it, 
come to us. That is the expectation we have given.
Compliance
C
We have a tendency to write too many procedures and not respect the craftsmanship…I think this is a very nice 
balance because I don't expect people to follow procedure if they certainly see that the procedure is wrong. I will 





I’ve seen that at A just by giving the right steer, the right expectations to guys. Don’t distract them with all kind 
of other shit, just let the guys focus on what they need to deliver and need to do and give them the few of the right 
tools and steers to them, makes a hell of a difference.
B
I think we've got potentially some strengthening of network and networks... Yes, that's where I'd like to see this 






If you've got a problem, you know who to contact to talk about that problem. It's not that you go outside and 




Page 46 of 51Academy of Management Discoveries
Table 6a - Summary Results of Coding of Causal Factors in Incident Documents
Incident Documents Coding Unique Frequency of Codes




Totals for Theoretical Categories
1st Order Codes
Incident Type Site
CAUSAL FACTORS AI NM PI A B C AI NM PI A B C
EP / EM Category
Inadequate communication of risk information 3 2 1 6 6 0
Inadequate hazard identification 7 1 0 11 6 9
Inadequate Management of Change 2 2 3 2 7 0
Inadequate risk awareness or assessment 3 3 1 2 6 9
Inadequate risk management controls 3 0 0 6 1 9
Hazard and Risk 
Management
18 8 5 27 26 27
Inadequate equipment or system design 13 14 1 6 27 35
Inadequate 
System Design
13 14 1 6 27 35
Inadequate construction QC 1 2 4 2 6 4
Inadequate maintenance, inspection or testing 9 5 4 15 13 17
Inspection & 
Testing
10 7 8 17 19 21
Inadequate job planning 3 3 6 9 5 13
Inadequate resourcing 2 1 0 0 3 4
Planning & 
Resourcing
5 4 6 9 8 17
Inadequate technical competence & training 5 2 1 2 8 13 Competence 5 2 1 2 8 13




Distractions or other error-enforcing conditions 2 0 1 4 0 13
Inadequate supervision, checking or monitoring 4 5 7 17 8 4
Operation outside design envelope 1 2 0 2 2 0
Reckless non-compliance 1 0 0 2 0 0
Unclear responsibilities 2 2 1 0 5 4
Well-meaning improvisation without full risk awareness 2 2 0 0 3 4




TOTALS EP 70 54 40 99 127 142




Lack of empowerment 1 0 0 2 0 0 Empowerment 1 0 0 2 0 0
Inadequate checking for wider implications 0 1 0 0 1 0
Lack of implementation of LFI actions 5 1 0 4 5 9
Organizational 
Learning




Inadequate mindfulness 2 3 1 6 3 4
Ineffective communication 2 4 1 4 6 4
Lack or loss of Situation Awareness 1 2 0 0 3 4
Risk normalization 1 1 0 2 1 0
Non-Technical 
Skills




TOTALS EM 14 12 2 18 21 16
Blame culture 2 0 1 4 2 0
Production pressure 5 1 3 6 6 9
Blame and 
Pressure
7 1 4 10 8 9 CONTEXT
AI NM PI A B C
Total number of incidents
59 34 24 32 69 16
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Table 6b - Summary Results of Coding of Recommendations in Incident Documents
Incident Documents Coding Unique Frequency of Codes





by Site Incident Type SITE
RECOMMENDATIONS AI NM PI A B C AI NM PI A B C
EP / EM Category
Improve communication of risk information 4 0 7 2 8 13
Improve hazard identification and risk assessment 2 2 0 0 4 4
Review risk management studies 3 1 1 2 6 0
Hazard and Risk 
Management
9 3 8 4 18 17
Improve equipment or system design 8 10 4 9 19 17
Review engineering design 6 12 3 2 23 4
Equipment or 
System Design
14 22 7 11 42 21
Improve maintenance, inspection or testing 9 3 6 15 12 13 Inspection & Testing 9 3 6 15 12 13
Review or improve work planning 5 1 3 9 1 26 7 2 3




Improve technical competence & training 5 6 9 6 16 9 Competence 5 6 9 6 16 9
Improve procedures or other tech documents 10 7 18 24 23 13
Review procedures or other tech documents 5 5 1 9 7 13




Clarify roles & responsibilities 3 2 9 4 8 17
Improve supervision, checking or monitoring 3 2 4 2 6 13




TOTALS EP 65 52 65 84 136 151
Emergency Response 3 4 9 Emergency Response 3 4 9
Recognise or give appreciation of good work 0 0 1 2 0 0
Support people involved in incidents 1 0 0 0 0 4
Recognition and 
Support
1 0 1 2 0 4
Explore wider learning implications 3 7 3 6 9 13
Improve implementing of learning into practice 2 0 3 2 3 4
Improve learning from Incidents communication 2 0 1 0 3 9
Improve routine learning from practice 1 0 0 0 0 4
Reflective incident review 2 0 3 0 1 22
Organizational 
Learning




Improve communication 1 1 0 4 1 0
Improve reflective mindfulness 1 1 0 2 1 0
improve teamwork 1 0 1 0 0 9
Undergo behavioural safety training 1 0 0 2 0 0




TOTALS EM 18 9 12 18 18 65
Decisive action for safety 0 0 1 0 1 0
Reinforce safety priority 2 1 1 4 2 4
Safety Messaging 2 1 2 4 3 4 CONTEXT
AI NM PI A B C
Total number of incidents 59 34 24 32 69 16
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Table 7a – EXTRACT of Table SUP-4a  Categorisation of Causal Factors from Incident Documents
Theor. Cat. Site Illustrative Quote from Incident Documents - Causal Factors
EP / EM 
Category
A
Coordinator and System Owner left the work location and supervision of Operation Support personnel was left to 
Area 1 mech execution lead
B The Isolation Authority did not cross-check with P&ID to identify the correct vesselCompliance





This was a repeat incident, the previous investigation of a small acid leak at the same location did not identify 
the correct root cause, therefore the weak signal was not followed through.
B
Of significant concern is that as there has been at least three similar incidents have occurred at [Site B] in the 
past five year, it is clear that with regard to this issue that organisation learning has not happened 
Organizational 
Learning




Table 7b – EXTRACT of Table SUP-4b Illustrative Quotes and Categorisation of Recommendations from Incident Documents
Theor. Cat. Site Illustrative Quote from Incident Documents - Recommendations EP / EM Cat.
A
Operations personnel involved in this incident to develop a safety briefing highlighting exactly what went 
wrong and the potential consequences
B






Communicate to all relevant parties the incident learnings and how to work safely on live systems with 
compression fittings.
A Maintenance team to review current JHA with update to include hazard of xxx services
B Define well integrity work programme and establish whether resourcing levels are adequate
Planning & 
Resourcing





Any sudden change in Flow other than normal to be communicated by [Plant] PO to [Facilities] PO 
(Panel Operators)




To avoid future similar incidents Projects /Asset to share practices between Platform and Onshore plant 
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Table 8 – Comparison of the Results of the 3 Studies:  Rep Grid, Semi-Structured Interviews and Incident Documents




EM ORGANIZATION  PRACTICES EM WORKING PRACTICES CONTEXT


































































REP GRID Y Y Y Y Y Y
SEMI-STRUCTAI
INCID. DOCS Y Y Y Y Y
REP GRID Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
SEMI-STRUCTNM
INCID. DOCS Y Y Y





INCID. DOCS Y Y
REP GRID Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
SEMI-STRUCT Y Y YA
INCID. DOCS Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
REP GRID Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
SEMI-STRUCT Y YB
INCID. DOCS Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
REP GRID Y Y Y Y Y Y
SEMI-STRUCT Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
SITES
C
INCID. DOCS Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Indicates IMPEDING
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A) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON METHODS 
Data Collection 
Three fieldwork sites 
Site A was a large petrochemicals complex in the Middle East that had been started up only a few 
years earlier. The site operated continuously with a typical 24h shift pattern, supervised from a 
state-of-the-art central control room in radio communication with field operators monitoring the 
physical plant.  The organization was fairly hierarchical, emphasising the importance of 
compliance with procedures. The operations and maintenance organizations were populated 
largely with ex-patriot workers of numerous different nationalities, predominantly Asian, and also 
many from Europe, Australasia and North America. The organization was still in transition from 
project-based to operations-based, with a number of modification projects in process. The site 
received significant specialist support from the parent organization in engineering and other fields. 
Although it had had a good safety record during construction, the site had suffered a number of 
significant process safety incidents in the early years of operation, including some fatalities.  
 
Site B was an oil and gas onshore production operation in the Asia-Pacific region with a large 
number of geographically dispersed fields feeding a single large treatment and export plant. Many 
of the production units were in locations remote from support infrastructure and only visited 
periodically by technical personnel. The number of production units had been growing rapidly 
over the previous decade, and the older units had been designed and built to lower standards than 
the more modern ones. The organization was very much in the stage of developing and maturing, 
having been rapidly expanding for some years, drawing operator/technicians from the local 
population and providing extensive training, while maintaining a fairly flat hierarchy. The 
operation was in the process of adopting and implementing a new set of parent organization 
engineering and operating standards, for which the parent organization was providing some 
specialist support. There was significant concern to improve the process safety record, the site 
having suffered a number of significant incidents, including some high potential consequence near-
misses and potential incidents. 
 
Site C was an offshore oil and gas production operation in Europe, with a large offshore platform 
that had been in operation for over 20 years, supported by a team of engineering and operations 
support personnel located in a nearby onshore office. It was a mature organization that had evolved 
to be a fairly small stable team of people with considerable experience and a marked culture of 
mutual respect, open to much discussion up and down the fairly flat hierarchy; many people had 
worked together for some years and had rotated through a range of different roles. The organization 
was largely self-sufficient in terms of operational and technical expertise with good support from 
the parent organization as needed. The perceived safety performance was above average; it had 
recently been given a major award for its process safety performance. 
 




Types of Incident 
The incidents of interest to this research were process safety incidents, that is, those that can occur 
as a result of the high hazards of the oil and gas and chemical industry, typically fire, explosions 
and releases of toxic material, that can lead to major consequences such as deaths, serious injuries, 
major environmental effects and major financial losses.  Our research was primarily concerned 
with incidents that had or could have had consequences of 3 to 5 on the consequence scale shown 
in Table SUP- 2 drawing on Summers, Vogtmann and Smolen (2011).  
REFER TO TABLE SUP-2 
The definitions we used are: 
Actual incident:  real incident that happened (energy or hazardous material was released) and had 
significant actual consequences (Consequence level 3 to 5) 
Near-miss incident: real incident that happened (energy or hazardous material was released) 
without significant consequences - but could have had level 3 to 5 consequences  
Potential incident – unsafe act or condition that could have led to an incident (Consequence level 
3 to 5) but was stopped from developing into a real incident, without release of energy or hazardous 
material. 
 
The three types of incident examined in this study, Actual Incident (AI) Near Miss (NM) and 
Potential Incident (PI) are understood more completely with reference to the ‘bow tie’ hazard 
management diagram (ICI, 1979) an example of which is shown in Figure SUP-1.  
REFER TO FIGURE SUP-1 
A bow tie diagram portrays, for a particular hazard such as ‘pressurised flammable gas contained 
in a pipe’, a number of possible incident causation pathways. It also shows the progression of an 
incident from left to right through several stages of incubation (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). The 
left-hand side shows the mechanisms by which the hazard could be released, such as for an 
underground pipeline: corrosion, fatigue or excavator damage. These mechanisms are shown as 
‘threat lines’, along which are placed ‘barriers’ designed to prevent the threats from releasing the 
hazard.  Examples of such ‘prevention’ barriers are a steel containment envelope (the pipe), a 
process alarm with operator response, and an automatic shut-down system (CCPS and Energy 
Institute, 2018).  Each such ‘threat line’ can be seen as a partial Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 
1990a) (Hudson and Hudson, 2015). If the barriers (slices of Swiss Cheese) designed to contain 
the hazard from being released by a specific threat were all to fail simultaneously (the ‘holes’ in 
the slices of cheese all lining up) then a ‘top event’ would occur.  In the process industries a typical 
‘top event’ is a release of flammable gas.  The hazard could also be released by a previously 
unknown mechanism or one considered so unlikely as not to warrant preventative controls, a so-
called ‘Black Swan’ (Taleb, 2007).  On the right-hand side of the diagram, the known possible 
pathways that could lead to consequences are shown as continuations of the Swiss Cheese diagram. 
Along these pathways, ‘mitigation’ barriers are shown that are designed to reduce potential 
consequences such as injuries or damage from an incident such as explosion, fire or plume of toxic 
gas.  Examples of mitigation barriers are an automatic firefighting system, evacuation by lifeboat 
and use of an escape respirator. 
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In Figure SUP-1  an ‘Actual Incident’ (shown within the outer (red) box) is an event in which the 
hazard is released (a ‘top event’ occurs) and the hazard goes on to result in significant 
consequences (such as deaths, injuries or damage to plant and equipment due to fire or explosion).   
 
A ‘Near Miss’ is shown as the release of the hazard (again, a ‘top event’ occurs) that could have 
resulted in significant consequences but in fact for some reason did not (Reason, 1997: 118); this 
is shown as an event within the middle (orange) box. Finally, in contrast to both an Actual Incident 
and a Near Miss, a system weakness that is detected before it could result in the release of the 
hazard (no ‘top event’ occurs) is known as a ‘Potential Incident’ and is shown within the inner 
(green) box. Evidently in the case of an Actual Incident, all of the prevention barriers on at least 
one threat line proved ineffective, allowing the hazard to be released (for example creating a cloud 
of flammable gas) and unfortunately the mitigation barriers (for example gas detection system, 
remotely operated shutoff valve, water deluge system) were unable to stop the hazard from leading 
to significant consequences (in this example, the gas cloud being ignited with ensuing explosion 
and fire).  A Near Miss starts in a similar way to an Actual Incident, with release of the hazard, so 
evidently, as for an Actual Incident, all of the prevention barriers on at least one threat pathway 
proved ineffective. However, in a Near Miss, although the hazard is released, there are no 
significant consequences. This might be because of the effective operation of one or more designed 
mitigation barriers (such as the examples given above for Actual Incidents) or just by luck, such 
as a gas cloud dispersing before reaching a source of ignition. Another more potentially interesting 
mechanism that leads to a Near Miss rather than an Actual Incident is a successful improvised 
intervention. An example of this could be a vigilant operator correctly diagnosing an unexpected 
build-up of pressure and opening a valve to release the pressure, performing a non-standard but 
effective action. If such improvisations were frequently involved in the Near Miss incidents 
occurring in a particular organization that may be an indicator of the organization explicitly or 
tacitly supporting more adaptive, EM, practices than otherwise. 
 
It is Potential Incidents that are perhaps of most interest for this research. These are the ‘latent 
conditions’ and ‘active failures’ that are represented as holes in the ‘Swiss Cheese’ slices (Reason, 
1990a, 2016, 1997). If such a system weakness is detected before it has the opportunity to incubate 
into a release of the hazard, it is termed a ‘Potential Incident’. In the traditional view, such a system 
weakness could be a degraded or failed barrier, or it may be a ‘resident pathogen’ (Reason, 1990a: 
29) such as an ambiguous procedure, loss of currency in a technical skill, a maintenance backlog 
or an unclear critical communication. In the ‘Safety II’ view, a Potential Incident can also manifest 
as a degradation of mindfulness and expert improvisation that may normally be operating to 
maintain safety despite imperfect equipment or system design (Hollnagel, 2014). A system 
weakness representing a Potential Incident may be detected by luck, from a chance observation. 
Or it may be detected by the effective working of routine testing or inspection process that was 
designed specifically to detect such weaknesses. Or a Potential Incident may be detected by a 
vigilant human operator, technician or engineer discovering some anomaly, perhaps by a diligent, 
thorough analysis of an unusual indication in the control room.  
 
These latter two mechanisms are of most interest for this research. The identification of a Potential 
Incident provides the opportunity for an organization to learn about a system weakness and correct 
or mitigate it before it can incubate into either an Actual Incident or a Near Miss.  An organization’s 
ability to identify Potential Incidents may therefore be a useful indicator of its safety.  
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Repertory Grid Interview Technique 
We asked each participant to come to the interview prepared to discuss six incidents, two of each 
type (actual incident, near miss and potential incident) with which they were personally familiar, 
and in order to focus on significant incidents, that had or could have had consequences of level 3 
to 5 inclusive on a scale of severity (see Table SUP - 2).  We did not discuss incidents resulting 
from highly unpredictable events, so-called ‘Black Swans’ (Taleb, 2007) as these would be less 
likely to provide insights into action errors. 
 
To help participants prepare, we sent them a pre-interview briefing note (see below) that included 
definitions of the three different incident types. At the beginning of each interview we also checked 
the participant’s understanding, using a visual portrayal of the three incident types shown on the 
bow tie model diagram (CCPS and Energy Institute, 2018) (see Figure SUP - 1).  Although the 
bow tie model represents a typically EP view of how hazards are controlled, each incident pathway 
shown on the bow tie also represents a ‘Swiss Cheese’ model (Reason, 1990a) ‘undoubtedly the 
most popular accident causation model’ (Underwood and Waterson, 2014: 76) which can also 
encompass an EM view, in that the independence of the cheese slices, commonly interpreted as 
‘defences in depth’, can become degraded in common failure modes that require an EM approach 
to identify and mitigate  (Hudson and Hudson, 2015). Both models were familiar to all participants.  
 
Having agreed with the participant the ‘topic’ of averting and mitigating process safety incidents, 
and the ‘elements’ as the six incidents chosen by the participant, the researcher conducted the 
interview using the following process: 
 
After asking the participant to describe briefly how each incident unfolded, and noting each one 
on a card pre-printed with the relevant incident type definition, the researcher selected three, laying 
the cards in front of the participant, and asked the standard question:  “Considering these three 
incidents, please think about how two of these were similar, and thereby different from the third 
one?”. While the participant reflected on this the researcher occasionally moved the cards around 
and prompted “In what sense are they similar and different?”.  
 
Picking out a key word or phrase the participant used in responding, the researcher then asked the 
interviewee to describe the two extremes of that idea.  The construct and its polar opposite or ‘pole’ 
were then summarised into short phrases describing these two extremes.  After the interviewee had 
confirmed their agreement to the wording, the researcher wrote down these phrases at each end of 
the first line on a prepared repertory grid sheet and asked the participant to clarify the meaning of 
construct with the question: “In what way is [Construct] important to you in regard to describing 
these incidents?".   
 
The participant’s response to this was captured in the interview recording and later used to 
contextualise the construct, to help with categorisation as part of the data analysis. Next, the 
interviewee was asked to score the three events on a scale from 1 to 4, with 4 representing the 
extreme of the construct and 1 representing the extreme of the pole. Finally, the interviewee was 
asked to score the remaining events on the same scale, thus creating the first line of the repertory 
grid.   
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Further different combinations of three incidents (‘triads’) were then used to elicit other constructs. 
The triads were presented in a pre-determined sequence designed so that as far as practically each 
incident type was represented equally. With each triad, a new construct was sought; no repeat 
constructs were allowed, so the interviewee was encouraged to think more deeply about the 
incidents as the interview progressed. This process continued until the interviewee could think of 
no new constructs;  the result of the interview was the participant’s repertory grid summarising 
their personal views about the incidents.  
 
PRE-INTERVIEW BRIEFING NOTE (email sent to each interviewee before interview) 
Dear (INSERT NAME)  
Thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed about process safety incidents. The purpose 
of this research is to examine what operational and technical people see as the important factors 
that influence process safety. I would like to emphasise that this is voluntary you are free to leave 
the interview at any time. In addition, the contents of the interview will remain confidential and 
anonymous. With your permission, the interview will be recorded. 
I would emphasise that the subject of this research is process safety - meaning basically avoiding 
explosions, fires and toxic releases - the sort of incidents that can result from the nature of the plant 
and the materials it contains. These incidents can lead to multiple fatalities and serious injuries as 
well as major environmental impact and asset damage.   
In the interview I would like to ask you about a number of process safety-related occurrences that 
you know about, to get your personal interpretation of the circumstances and factors affecting 
them. Before the interview, please choose two examples of each of the following types of 
occurrence: 
Actual incident:  real incident that happened (energy or hazardous material was released) and had 
significant actual consequences (Consequence level 3 to 5) 
Near-miss incident: real incident that happened (energy or hazardous material was released) 
without significant consequences - but could have had level 3 to 5 consequences  
Potential incident – unsafe act or condition that could have led to an incident (Consequence level 
3 to 5) but was stopped from developing into a real incident, without release of energy or hazardous 
material. 
Please come to the interview ready to talk about each of them, i.e. a total of six occurrences. Please 
also bring with you basic documentation about each one: incident report, database  reference etc. 
The objective is to get your personal views about each one:  What happened, how it occurred, and 
the things that were happening during and in the lead-up to the incident that may have influenced 
the people involved to act as they did. During the interview I will ask you about how they compare 
and contrast, following a straightforward process. The interview should take 1 to 1½ hours 
maximum. 
Thank you once again for your help with this research.  I look forward very much to meeting and 
working with you. 
Best wishes  
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B) ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table SUP-1 Summary profiles of the three sites 
 Site A Site B Site C 
Overview Very large single site 
Petrochemicals 
complex 
Onshore Oil & Gas 
production, Large number of 
remote production units 
dispersed geographically; 
single large treatment and 
export plant 
Offshore Oil & Gas 
production, single platform; 
onshore technical and 
operations support 
Location Middle East Asia Pacific Europe 
Organization form Strong hierarchy Hierarchy / open culture Weak hierarchy / open culture 
Personnel Largely ex-patriot  Largely local Largely local 
No. of people 2000+ 4000+ 200+ 
Organizational 
Maturity 
In transition from very 
large Project to 
Operations 
Mixed; rapidly growing 
number of physical assets 
Stable; very mature 





In process of adopting Parent 
Org technical standards 




Mixed Below average Above average 
 
Table SUP-2  Consequence Severity Scale    Reference: (Summers, Vogtmann and Smolen, 2011) 
 People Environmental damage Asset loss / Operation impact 
5 Multiple fatalities  Catastrophic off-site damage >$10M and substantial offsite damage 
4 1 or more fatalities Significant off-site damage $1M - $10M and severe impact 
3 Hospitalization injury  On-site or offsite release with damage $100K - $1M and significant impact 
2 Lost workday injury  On-site or offsite release without damage $10 - $100K and some impact  
1 Recordable injury  On-site release < $10K and minor impact 
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Table SUP–3  Illustrative Quotes & Categorisation of Factors from Semi-Structured Interviews  




The permit applicant goes in the morning and applies for a permit. Then he is taking about half an hour or 45 
minutes, then he will go to the field to meet the field operator…Then he will give a toolbox talk…then there's a 
last-minute risk assessment. So I think people arriving to the site, for example, at six o'clock in the morning start 





When something is a barrier impact, it might be the level of SCE fail or something. It might be something 
reported in the field but it is still just a manual entry and risk assessment into the barrier model.  
C 
Okay we have risk matrices, risk meetings…My team has meetings with C and D to discuss safety issues and I 
attend an Ops team meeting where we discuss the issues… They have morning meetings offshore, onshore every 




when you think about technical authority and the clarity of the technical authority and roles and responsibilities. 
It is there, but it is effective or not? I am neutral, I don’t think we are there yet. 
B 
There's definitely a genuine interest in some of those key things such as asset integrity, process safety review 
meeting, the incident review panel, and the MOC meeting. That's key. The safety guys often ran those things. 
Now, the new leadership is, "no, I will chair that" 
C 
We do regular surveillance, the team do surveillance before the morning meeting, and also after. It's not only a 
red and green. It's a bit richer than that, Yes. Because you need to both understand, is it trending upwards or 
downwards? Is it stable? Can we do better? 
Competence 
A 
So the guy goes into the field, opens the valve - which he shouldn’t open. With the best intent. Experienced 
operator with the best intent, but there’s more around does this guy understand our process safety mindset, our 
process safety behaviours? Does he understand you don’t open a drain valve on a running line at 3.5 bar? 
B 
They've never been educated around process safety risks…. Having to move from a mindset where blow-torching 
the pig launchers to get the paint off was an operational task on a live plant, no permit required… to the point 
where you're purging and leak testing for every service that you complete, is quite a mindset change 
C I think it's very experienced personnel in the control room. The operators, they know the hazards very good. 
Procedures 
A 
We create a lot of paperwork; we do create a lot of paperwork versus other sites where I’ve worked where 
there’s a lot less paperwork. I think this is an interesting one in that if you create a new organization, and you’re 
bringing people in from all over the place …you tend to therefore document things very rigidly… 
B 
…we're a long way from where we need to be. The procedures that we've got in the business are one task fits all. 
If I pull out the procedures now it will say this is what the plant operator does, this is what the control room 
contributes into it, this is what the next person will do. It…becomes very disjointed. 
C 
I think that we have quite good systems that should we have the FSR reports and show that. We have this -- 
When we have a deviation it is quite a good group of people sitting together in discussion, and challenging each 
other and have mitigation. We also have several systems that should cover all these issues  
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So very interactive session, about two hours, we do it every quarter on a couple of processes. And that gives two 
ways. That gives them the way of our assurance on how healthy we are in execution, but it also gives the 





I think the way that I do it is I engage the technicians in doing all of the red lining and reviewing of 
procedures… typically use night shift. To walk and red line the procedures. Is this currently what we do?  
C 
They have found several errors between the control room master P&ID and on the site. They have then now 
suggested to actually elevate this as a bigger project…I know that when they raise that to their leadership, they 
will get support of doing that. 
Compliance 
A 
But always the issue is the implementation. For example, when you see the documentation, and the rules and 
procedures, everything is there, but who is going to implement it. So the leaders are giving the coaching, 





If you feel the procedure is not working, the procedure is not letting you to get to the desired objective, stop it, 
come to us. That is the expectation we have given. 
C 
We have a tendency to write too many procedures and not respect the craftsmanship…I think this is a very nice 
balance because I don't expect people to follow procedure if they certainly see that the procedure is wrong. I will 





I’ve seen that at A just by giving the right steer, the right expectations to guys. Don’t distract them with all kind 
of other shit, just let the guys focus on what they need to deliver and need to do and give them the few of the right 





I think we've got potentially some strengthening of network and networks... Yes, that's where I'd like to see this 
get to but where we're at the moment is probably reliant on …communications and networks at the field manager 
/ superintendent level. 
C 
If you've got a problem, you know who to contact to talk about that problem. It's not that you go outside and 




We used to crack open the bypass and then things are getting managed. But then it was challenged by the 
technologists; how do your operators bypass this? But this should not come after bypass opening, this should 
have come before bypass opening. If you can’t open the bypass, we should have not designed the bypass.  
B 
You're going to leave it a little bit loose, the micro-manager will want to check everyone's activity… You have 
that. You also have a person who completely trusts his people, which does the opposite extreme and can result in 
people pushing themselves outside where…their confidence level goes above where their actual competency is. 
It's finding that balancing point between the competency and the confidence to allow people to use that 
C 
I think this is a very nice balance because I don't expect people to follow procedure if they certainly see that the 
procedure is wrong. I will not challenge them a lot on the way they, in fact, will do the task but I will challenge 
them to document the difference 
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We are reasonably well engaged in the two-way, then ideas, suggestions do get raised from the ground floor 





We have some KPIs in people's goals around identifying a better way of work or coming up with a business 
improvement…things like that. I don't think we're as focused on to this as we could be. 
C 
Then we give feedback to the person that's raised the question and it's open for everyone to go in and see. We 
also have to put good feedback if we decide not to do it, but actually we do. I think we try to do about 70, 75% 




We have a multi-cultural environment. We have people working from different countries…It’s advantageous 
because people have worked in different environments and they have a different mindset to work.  
B 
…if this role says in our daily meeting, "I need a hand," it's now actually my job to go and find the engineer 
and go and chase... You need something, you're going to work it all out. 
C 
More systematic. Better instruction and procedure. The people, our leaders, make this procedure and 
instruction. They are not: “our leadership is making the procedure and instruction, and here we are”... but the 




Give the work back to the people and be very clear, all leaders, about what you expect of people. I say that to 
my Board, it’s such a danger so I’ve been focussing on process safety for the past year. We didn’t have any 
process safety incidents, hardly any weak signals. We really stepped up tremendously. I’ve shown it now for a 
year, how do I make sure that next year I will show that same rigour on this subject? 
B 
Managers come in bringing new ideas, but also get trained in what the safety culture is of the business by the 
people at the lower level now. I'm actually seeing that leadership transitioning from the managers that brought 
them in in the first place, down to people on the ground actively leading in on the safety culture 
C 
If you are putting three or four people together in a working group, it's normal that one of them taking the lead 
in the group because he might have some more experience on the working and mostly what they're going to do. 
Also, the foreman tried to put people together, so we always have one that's very experienced 
Sensemaking / 
sensegiving  & 
challenging 
A 
If you then ask all of them there, they will tell you this, this guy always ask the question because I told him sir. I 
need to ask you because something when wrong and I did not ask you maybe I will do something foolish there, so 





It's no good bringing something out and saying you're doing this. First, they've got to convince me that whilst I'm 
no expert on any one subject, if I can see it, if I feel it's okay, then I’ve got half a chance of convincing the team 
as okay, and not just following the direction because it's a piece of paper. 
C 
We have worked a lot to connect individuals with the strategy, so you see how you contribute. What's my purpose 
in this organization? Everyone here should be able to answer that question 
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One of our guys who put test packs together, he noticed on our relief valve that an impulse tube was 
disconnected…luckily this lad knew what he was looking at, realised the consequences and stepped in 





There's very active asset integrity inspection programs, testing programs, maintenance programs. There's all 
systemized methods of doing that. There's also encouragement of hazard reporting across most of the business  
C 
I think we're fairly good, we have very few actual incidents. We have quite a lot of potential incidents, and I 




I think we're learning how to use incidents as weak signals and I think when you do that, if you jump on 
everything you create also a lot of unrest in the organization.  
B 
It's definitely changed now, though commissioning was definitely production based: Let's get it finished and get 
it online. But now it's a lot more… stop and think a lot more 
C 
Yes, you trust your good experience and your competence that even though it's in a procedure, well maybe this 




Ownership in shifts is always difficult... So there is someone in day shift, in the operations management space, 
who we’ve put in the driving seat to make the calls on the higher risk activities 
B 
If a couple descriptions weren't right on a work order, if we don't know 100%, we just revert it all back and 
make sure we get exactly the information that we require.  
C 
We also have introduction of situation-based information on those big screens. I take it on the big screen and 
show the shift going off goes through the logbook and say what they have done, and…then the day man, when 




You see those teams maturing at the moment, but the intervention we needed to make was we believe those 
teams are at the moment not... mature enough to make the calls on whether or not we are good enough to go...  
B So I try to get them thinking about barriers. The Swiss Cheese model and the outcomes if you don't. 
C 
We don't know everything and so we have to be aware and do a lot of campaigns. So now when we have these 




If it was a safety threat, myself, my panel operators and my field operators are all empowered to take a decision 
of shut down or isolating or making the plant safe if it feels to be unsafe.  
B …if something’s urgent, at my technician level, they can deal with certain things, then they can escalate 
C 
That respect for what level of organization is doing what and accept that you can't know everything at any time. 
That means a lot to me, that my boss appreciate that I tell him, "I don't know… The only thing I know, I have 
good people on it, and I will tell you when we have more information." 
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Theor. Cat. Site Illustrative Quote from Semi-Structured Interviews EP / EM Cat. 
Culture 
A The best way is to just whatever happens, you just come out and tell exactly what happened, just be frank so 
that people can learn okay this happened so we should just avoid. But suppose if I say like this, then there will 
be a lot of finger pointing, then we end up missing actually what caused this one. 
Contextual 
Conditions 
B I would say the reporting culture in itself is excellent within the company. I do believe it's certainly one of the 
best I've seen. However, in terms of investigation and action on low level near misses I would say we are poor. 
C I also think that you are allowed to speak up. Also the management actually expects you to speak up. By having 
this open dialogue and also that extra dare to speak up and also have that ownership. 
Structure & 
Maturity 
A We went into operating mode without considering what the right organization needs to be. So now we’re at a 
point where we are in an operating phase and mature enough where we can start to say what activities do we 
have? How are we going to execute those activities? And then how much resources ...? 
B I've been in B now for six years. It's only really been the last 18 months or so that I would say it feels like an 
operating company. Before that, it felt like a projects company but that will be in operation. Then suddenly we 
had all this stuff built and handed over. 
C Tomorrow we're doing this monthly, it's an integrity, safety and reliability meeting. Then we go through all the 
safety critical elements and issues... The whole management team knows what's going on. Most of them, they 




Table SUP–4a  Illustrative Quotes & Categorisation of Causal Factors from Incident Documents 
Theor. Cat. Site Illustrative Quote from Incident Documents - Causal Factors 










No clear MOC process was followed that permitted a deviation from the original design specification with 
respect to particulate service… 




pump was installed and operated with insufficient discharge line support. Pulsating action combined with 
insufficient support led to line stress and loosened bolts on discharge flange. 
B The relief valves are undersized for the blocked outlet case at warm starting conditions 
C 
The current design of switchboard cabinets gives false sense of security with only one isolation device in the 




The motor has been installed at site and power cable has been terminated at motor end without verifying the 
winding connection for 690V supply voltage. 
B The third-party inspection was ineffective in identifying manufacturing defects 
C failed to identify the wiring error at different stages (this is one of the underlying causes for the incident) 
Planning & 
Resourcing 
A Requirement for permit not identified as part of [Engineering] spading plan 
B Additional training / experience with the TEG Pump skid would have prevented the error 
C Planning process did not involve all relevant parties (subsea, environment and operation). 
Competence 
A He was not given proper coaching about the existing procedures/systems  
B 
There is no standard practice for training, just learning from a “more experienced” technician on how to 
complete individual tasks, as opposed to attaining an understanding of the equipment functionality 
C 
The field/CCR operators had not in-depth knowledge of the way these different level transmitters work and the 
required operating conditions 
Procedures 





The Work Instruction assigned to the job added limited value and did not relate the critical components of the 
work scope  
C Insufficient warnings in field/drawings to alert users to hazard of trapped pressure 
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Theor. Cat. Site Illustrative Quote from Incident Documents - Causal Factors 




Coordinator and System Owner left the work location and supervision of Operation Support personnel was left to 
Area 1 mech execution lead EP 
WORKING 
PRACTICES 
B The Isolation Authority did not cross-check with P&ID to identify the correct vessel 







B Delay in mobilising Emergency Response Team to incident. 
C 
Emergency Coordinator did not log manually the communication (process will be automatic if Crisis Manager 
portal was used, but they did not log into system) 
Empowerment 






This was a repeat incident, The previous investigation of a small acid leak at the same location did not identify 
the correct root cause, therefore the weak signal was not followed through. 
B 
Of significant concern is that as there has been at least three similar incidents have occurred at [Site B] in the 
past five year, it is clear that with regard to this issue that organisation learning has not happened  
C Knowledge of similar incidents was not sufficiently taken into account in planning process. 
Non-Technical 
Skills 





Risk identified during turn around, partial isolation applied by one shift though removed by the following shift 
due to confusion of the intention of the isolation & believing it was not required 
C 
The ‘organizational memory’ had a negative impact this time, since the assumption that one of the instruments 
did not work due to methanol in the mixture. ‘Organizational memory’ determined the opening earlier, since the 




Time pressure resulted in Area 1 mech supervisor executing the work himself instead of searching for different 
support personnel 
CONTEXT B 
more focussed with production / cost saving initiatives than asset integrity. Concern was explicitly voiced that 
these fires are continually occurring.  
C 
Operator stressed to complete job within the night shift and stressed by weather conditions (heavy rains, papers 




Table SUP–4b  Illustrative Quotes & Categorisation of Recommendations from Incident Documents 





Operations personnel involved in this incident to develop a safety briefing highlighting exactly what went 





Develop communication to staff to clarify use of electrical and non-intrinsically safe equipment inside the 
plant. 
C 




A Design and install permanent heat tracing for the external balance line at first opportunity 
B 
Revise interlock logic sequencing of XV-1234 to ensure that secondary interlock activates regardless of 
whether XV-1234 finishes closing 
C 
CCTV surveillance inside the hood against leak critical components and areas in turbine must be 
prioritized and put into action 
Inspection & 
Testing 
A Trace material certificates of valve stem to check for sub-standard part 
B 
Implement revised Maintenance strategy to overhauls of drive head motors and ensure associated QA/QC 
& testing meets strategy requirements 
C 
Good practice is to double check all links when one considers the job as done, preferably by one 
colleague if you work more together 
Planning & 
Resourcing 
A Maintenance team to review current JHA with update to include hazard of xxx services 
B Define well integrity work programme and establish whether resourcing levels are adequate 
C The matrix for start-up should be reviewed 
Competence 
A 
Job Safety Analysis (JSA) standard/training/authorisation/auditing procedure required. Action PTW Lead 
by end Q3 
B 
Develop and implement a skills maintenance program for all activities. Reinforce proper operations 
practices via recurring training program 
C 




add new step in maintenance procedure: to stroke test valves in the field after installation to confirm 
actuator is moving freely 
B 
New procedure to facilitate the depressurizing of the Piping ex. the discharge XV’s to fin fan rack after 
N2 purging of the respective compressors 
C 
Update current PTW procedure to clarify roles and responsibilities for small repairs activities on the 
handed over equipment 
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Theor. Cat. Site Illustrative Quote from Incident Documents - Recommendations EP / EM Cat. 
Compliance 
A 
Assign a PPE focal point as per the PPE Procedure, and complete an audit and feedback regarding the 
use and effectiveness of various PPE EP 
WORKING 
PRACTICES 
B Review expectations and roles of performing authorities in relation to performing and supervising work. 
C 
A matrix on the difference between normal operation functions and the SD functions regarding roles and 








Establish clear expectation about the required wellsite emergency response by staff in case of gas release 
at wellsite. 
C Conduct a separate review of the emergency response activities carried out after the incident 
Recognition and 
Support 
A Appreciation to be given to the Area 1 FO (Field Operator) 
B None 
C 
Update the Duty Manager responsibilities to include ensuring that all persons involved in an incident 




Share Investigation results with other areas to create awareness where XYZ pumps or temporary 
equipment is used 
B 
Review PSV dossier for all other similar PSV on other facilities to determine if there is any evidence of an 
installed failure 
C 
Giving a problem statement, a solution or an action will probably not shift your belief. Giving you 




Any sudden change in Flow other than normal to be communicated by [Plant] PO to [Facilities] PO 
(Panel Operators) EM 
WORKING 
PRACTICES 
B staff to avoid (perception of) informal instruction and multiple accountable persons 
C 
To avoid future similar incidents Projects /Asset to share practices between Platform and Onshore plant 
and possibly agree one leading practice 
Safety 
Messaging 
A Safety stand down conducted to communicate incident 
CONTEXT B 
In light of lessons learnt from incident, senior management team to address shutdown safety village to 
provide message on the importance of safety above all else 
C 
Stand-down with all shifts. Emphasize respect for isolation plans: set isolation plans shall not be broken 




Table SUP-5  Differentiation between EP and EM 
EP Paradigm EM Paradigm 
Basic assumption:  Error prevention is necessary and 
sufficient for avoidance of negative outcomes 
Basic assumption: Errors cannot be completely 
prevented and are opportunities for learning 
Basic strategy: eliminate error precursors Basic strategy: detect, mitigate and learn from errors 
Tactics: Tactics: 
Identification of potential errors & precursors: Error detection: 
Analysis of hazards and risks /  Risk Management 
‘Preoccupation with failure’  
(suspicion of errors; standard checks and tests) 
‘Fail-safe’ & ergonomic design of systems and 
equipment 
‘Situation awareness’   
(Vigilance / Sensemaking / Anticipation) 
 Communication 
 ‘Psychological safety’ for speaking up 
 Error management training 
Elimination of potential errors & precursors: Error mitigation: 
Systems and equipment inspection & maintenance 
Interventions by others  
(Teamwork; Emergent Leadership)  
Planning & Resourcing Avoidance of error cascades 
Competence assurance Collaborative problem-solving / Deference to expertise 
Formal work procedures Emergency Response 
Compliance enforcement  
Avoidance of distractions  
Supervision  
Command and control / Escalation to hierarchy  
  
Improvement: Learning from errors:  
Embedding improvements by the operation of a  
Plan-Do-Check-Act management system 
Incident Investigation & Analysis  
(including near miss and potential incidents) 
 Secondary error prevention  (reducing recurrence) 
 Improved understanding of the system  
 Improved safety climate and culture 
  
Characteristics of organizations espousing only EP 
Characteristics of organizations adopting EM as 
well as EP 
‘Zero-tolerance’ mindset and climate Culture of no blame  / acceptance of errors 
Blame culture  Open communication about errors 
Reluctance  to report errors 
Ambidexterity  
/ Collaborative competent improvisation 
Performance improvement limited by above Long term performance improvement 
 
NOTE:  This table has been synthesised from the existing literature (Van Dyck et al., 2005; Frese and Keith, 2015; 
Frese and Zapf, 1994; Goodman et al., 2011; Hofmann and Frese, 2011; Lei, Naveh and Novikov, 2016; Reason, 
1990a; Zapf, Prumper and Frese, 1992).  
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C) ADDITIONAL FIGURES 






Fig SUP-2  Extract from Reliability Matrix 
  
The axes of the reliability matrix are formed of the construct categories established separately by each researcher team, 
together with the reference numbers of the individual constructs the teams allocated to each category. Individual 
constructs that were categorised differently from the other team are shown in red. The intersecting cells in the matrix, 
shaded grey, contain the individual constructs allocated by both teams to the same category. Constructs agreed by 
both teams as fitting into two categories are shown in bold and marked with an asterisk.   
  
REF 1 2 3 4
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